Section (e)(7) is violated “to the extent that the [agency] has engaged in the practice of collecting protected information, unconnected to any investigation of past, present or anticipated violations of the statutes which it is authorized to enforce ... ”
How later courts described this case
- Section (e)(7) is violated “to the extent that the [agency] has engaged in the practice of collecting protected information, unconnected to any investigation of past, present or anticipated violations of the statutes which it is authorized to enforce ... ”
- “The language of paragraph (d)(1) expressly limits its applicability to records contained within a system of records.”
- "The Privacy Act expressly provides for injunctive relief for only two types of agency misconduct, that is, wrongful withholding of documents under subsection (d)(1) and wrongful refusal to amend an individual's record under subsection (d)(3). The remedy for violations of all other provisions of the Act is limited to recovery of damages upon a showing that the agency acted in an intentional or willful manner."
- “The language of subsections (e)(1) and (e)(5) compels a different analysis. Unlike subsection (e)(7), these subsections do not address the protections afforded to individuals by the First Amendment .... ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLARK, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring.
I enthusiastically concur in Judge Tuttle’s opinion which admirably and painstakingly analyzes a citizen’s First Amendment protection of his freedom of speech rights as amplified by the Privacy Act. However, once again I take issue with the holding that a pro se litigant who substantially prevails cannot recover attorney fees, as I did in Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1980). I recognize that precedent binds us as a panel and therefore under the law the instant opinion is correct.
Nevertheless, I continue to speak out against an interpretation of the statute that permits reimbursement for money spent for attorney fees but denies it for time spent to accomplish the same result. Time is precious to everyone. Taking time away from gainful employment or enjoyable leisure to enforce one’s rights is a valuable consideration for which reimbursement should be obtainable, and is just as much “a stock in trade” as is an attorney’s time. There is nothing in the Act or Congressional history to suggest that Congress intended to favor a person with money who could afford an attorney over a poorer person who could not, and who could not enlist free legal services.
Therefore, I register my disagreement with this holding, while recognizing that we as a panel are bound by Lovell .