holding alternatively that purpose of Younger abstention is to avoid conflict between state and federal governments; where conflict unavoidable, proper forum is federal court
How later courts described this case
- holding alternatively that purpose of Younger abstention is to avoid conflict between state and federal governments; where conflict unavoidable, proper forum is federal court
- finding abstention inappropriate where federal government sought to enjoin state authorities from taking disciplinary actions against a doctor employed by the federal government
- “[AJbstention bars prospective relief to a person not a party to the state action only in the extraordinary situation in which the interests of the state defendant and the federal plaintiff are so ‘intertwined’ as to be considered identical.”
- Younger abstention inappropriate when the United States seeks to assert a federal interest against a state
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
In its complaint before the court below, the United States alleged that it was threatened with irreparable harm and that it had no adequate remedy at law. However, the only threatened harm is, as pointed out in the majority opinion, that the United States, pending a ruling by the state court, must either alter its policies in the State of Georgia or risk having its employees who are assigned within Georgia subjected to state disciplinary action. The majority opinion speculates that in some cases this could mean a decrease in the quality or availability of health care services provided to already underserved areas.
*139 According to the district court, the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners essentially found that Dr. Lewis violated Georgia law by allowing Mr. Armstrong to write prescriptions without his cosignature. Apparently Mr. Armstrong could have written such prescriptions without Dr. Lewis’ co-signature if he had been certified as a physician’s assistant by the State of Georgia.
Thus, it appears that, pending a ruling by the state court, Dr. Lewis would be required to cosign all prescriptions written by Mr. Armstrong, apparently at Dr. Lewis’ direction.
I am not persuaded that such a requirement satisfies the test of “irreparable injury,” laid down in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 , 91 S.Ct. 746, 750 , 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and echoed by this court in Duke v. State of Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 248 (1973). Also, I believe the admonition by the Younger court (id. 401 U.S. at 45 , 91 S.Ct. at 751 ) “that the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions” tips the scales in support of abstention where the showing of irreparable injury is unclear.