subsection of statute providing “that the [medical review] [b]oard ‘may enter an order’ penalizing physicians who are found to have violated the statute ... [gives] the Board ... broad discretion to decline to take such action against physicians”
How later courts described this case
- subsection of statute providing “that the [medical review] [b]oard ‘may enter an order’ penalizing physicians who are found to have violated the statute ... [gives] the Board ... broad discretion to decline to take such action against physicians”
- district court held that interstate flow of revenues did not vest federal court with jurisdiction; court of appeals did not reach issue
- noting that the peer review privilege will not bar evidence in federal cause of action
- petitioning activity protected from state law liability as well as federal antitrust liability
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
As is his custom, Judge Wisdom has written an able opinion for the court. I fully concur in the result and without wishing to detract from his opinion, I wish to add a few thoughts of my own.
Dr. Palmer insists that his call to Dr. Whaley was a form of “administrative warning” contemplated by the Florida statutory scheme. The majority holds that at this juncture, summary judgment is improper on the Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 , 63 S.Ct. 307 , 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943) issue. With this determination, I agree. I wish, however, to write briefly to emphasize that our court has not held that Palmer has no Parker v. Brown exemption.
*554 The majority notes that summary judgment is improper on the Parker issue because: (1) Dr. Palmer announced to Dr. Whaley that his call was “personal” in nature, and (2) Dr. Palmer informed both Dr. Whaley and Dr. Mohammad that he had found no violation at the Center. I have no doubt that in the face of these facts, there remains a triable issue as to Dr. Palmer’s motive in making the call. I eschew, however, the majority’s characterization that this evidence is “strong” that Dr. Palmer was not acting within the scope of his authority when he made the calls. I would not be surprised to find that as a first step, such informal communications almost always precede a formal communication and official adjudication. In City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 434 U.S. 811 , 98 S.Ct. 1123, 1138 , 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978), the Supreme Court said that the Parker exemption does not depend on the ability “to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization.” Similarly, I do not think it is a requirement of Parker v. Brown that the official claiming the exemption must wear the robe and carry the mace before the exemption applies.