holding teacher bringing outsiders to meeting with superintendent merits constitutional protection
How later courts described this case
- holding teacher bringing outsiders to meeting with superintendent merits constitutional protection
- protecting teacher’s choice to bring her husband and representative of state teacher organization to a meeting with the superintendent about her personal contract
- “[T]here is no doubt that this circuit has adopted and now applies the Tinker test in cases involving the First Amendment rights of teachers.”
- associational activity of teacher bringing outsiders to meeting with superintendent is constitutionally protected
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion. I only wish to make explicit one additional standard to guide the district court on remand which I believe to be mandated by Judge Cowen’s analysis. In the discussion of Mrs. Hazlett’s claim, Judge Co wen correctly states that if Superintendent Payne’s decision not to renew Mrs. Hazlett’s contract was even “partially in retaliation” for the exercise of her associational rights to bring unannounced representatives to the meeting and to request that they be allowed to attend, that decision violates her constitutional rights. The court concludes from this general proposition that if the district court finds as a factual matter that Mrs. Hazlett merely declined an invitation to speak with Mr. Payne on his terms, then a further finding that Mr. Payne refused to renew her contract wholly or in part for Mrs. Hazlett’s exercise of her associational rights would require the conclusion that Mrs. Hazlett’s constitutional rights had been violated. I wish to add that even if the district court finds that Mrs. Hazlett did in fact disobey an order from her superior to meet with him alone concerning a subject within the scope of their employment relationship, it may enter a verdict in favor of the school board only if it further finds that her constitutionally protected first amendment conduct was not “a motivating fac *144 tor” in the non-renewal decision. I believe that this proposition is mandated by the court’s analysis and implicit in its holding.