The opinion
PELL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The possibility that foreign citizens admitted to this country only because their professional skills are needed here might never have to qualify to use them seems to have aspects of whimisicality which even Congressional critics would have difficulty in attributing to the Congress. I recognize that the nature of the preference system is such that people frequently apply for this entree while residing outside the United States and would not at the time their applications are processed have been certified by American licensing authorities. No doubt, therefore, a suitable period for study and licensing is implicit in that system. But insofar as the court’s statement that the “defendant did not have authority to revoke the October 4, 1971 notice on the ground that he gave,” ante at 1032 (emphasis added), implies that a preference once given is irrevocable despite repeated failures of the applicant to obtain the sine qua non of practicing his or her profession in this country, I respectfully dissent. Nothing in the pertinent statute limits such authority, which I think is implicit in the rationale of the professional preference system. I would also note my view that this issue, which the majority opinion purports not to decide because it was not “fully argued before us,” ante at 1032, was in fact exactly the question presented by the parties’ briefs and argument. 1
The result of the majority opinion seems to be that the Government, having failed in the October 4, 1971, notice to make express its understanding that appellant would have to qualify to practice her profession here within a reasonable time, is now es-topped to assert such a basis for revoking her preference. From this aspect of the opinion, also, I must dissent. As a general matter, the United States is not subject to an estoppel which impedes the exercise of its governmental functions. 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 132, at 799-802 (1966). There is surely no reason to think this rule less applicable in immigration matters. See Tang v. District Director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 298 F.Supp. 413,419-20 (C.D.Cal.1969), and cases cited therein. Moreover, even if an estoppel were somehow permissible in this context, appellant proffers, and I perceive, no significant basis for concluding that she relied to her detriment on the failure of the October 4 notice to specify the expectation that appellant would obtain a license.
In sum, the majority’s primary reliance on the lack of explicit expression in the Government’s notice of October 4, 1971, appears to me to be an extreme example of qui non negat fatetur.
Accordingly, while I agree with the court that the district court had jurisdiction of the case, I would affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint.
. I recognize that no abundance of case authorities was cited to us, and apparently such does not exist, but this would not seem to equate with a lack of full argument.