concluding that the personnel exception does not apply to a rule exempting personnel from some of the prohibitions of the Hatch Act for local elections in the District of Columbia because outsiders will be substantially affect- ed
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the personnel exception does not apply to a rule exempting personnel from some of the prohibitions of the Hatch Act for local elections in the District of Columbia because outsiders will be substantially affect- ed
- finding an action of the Civil Service Commission “legislative” in character
- “[Although a court should interpret the meaning of statutory language in light of the intent of its drafters, [it] cannot rewrite the statute to compensate for unforeseen circumstances. That power belongs to the legislature alone.”
- when agency clearly intended to exercise legislative rulemaking authority it cannot escape notice and comment requirement by subsequently arguing that the rule was interpretative
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MacKINNON, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the foregoing opinion but with respect to the interpretation of the first clause of 5 U.S.C. § 7327 (b)(1) (1975) as excluding the District of Columbia, 1 1 would emphasize that this conclusion results from the specific language of the statute and is not in any way dependent on “legislative history.”
While the provision, “in the immediate vicinity of the District of Columbia,” taken alone, might be said to include the actual area of the District of Columbia because a definite area might by some be said to be within its own vicinity, it is awkward to convey such intent in that manner and the full context of the statement makes it clear *1158 that Congress did not so intend. Had Congress intended to include the District of Columbia because of its proximity to the Nation’s Capital, it would have merely designated it by name, 2 but it did not do so. Instead the express wording of the statute clearly indicates that Congress intended to exclude the District of Columbia because it provided in the Act that the
municipality or political subdivision [should be] in Maryland or Virginia and in the immediate vicinity of the District of Columbia. .
Since no part of the District of Columbia is in either “Maryland or Virginia,” the District of Columbia is clearly excluded and it is immaterial whether one considers the District of Columbia to be within its own vicinity. Also, since the statute is clear there is no need to resort to legislative history that confirms the above interpretation. 3
Nothing in this opinion is intended to convey the impression that the District of Columbia might be excluded if it is found that a majority of voters are employed by the government of the United States. 4
The interpretation of the phrase “majority of voters” in . the second clause of section 7327(b)(1) to mean “majority of registered voters” can also be upheld simply on the internal logic of the statute’s phraseology. This exception is addressed to situations where federal employees dominate an electorate. To base the determination of dominance on some standard other than fully eligible registered voters could defeat the logic of the section, where an area predominates in federal employees, but, perhaps due to apathy engendered by their being barred from taking part in the campaigns, less than a majority of the registered voters are federal employees. Thus, any interpretation other than “registered voters” would cut against the plain object of the exception. 5
. Majority op., p. - of 180 U.S.App.D.C., p. 1154 of 554 F.2d.
. As it did in specifically designating municipalities in Maryland and Virginia.
. Majority op., p. - of 180 U.S.App.D.C., p. 1154 of 554 F.2d. 86 Cong.Rec. 2976-78 (1940).
. At the time of the 1976 Presidential election there were 262,887 registered voters in the District of Columbia. 171,469 voted.
. If registration was not required for voting a different interpretation would be required. The sense of the section is to refer to any fully eligible voter.