suggesting that a district court’s finding that a defendant is a special offender involves “historical facts;” thus implying clearly erroneous standard
How later courts described this case
- suggesting that a district court’s finding that a defendant is a special offender involves “historical facts;” thus implying clearly erroneous standard
- noting that “evaluation of the character of the defendant and a prediction of future con‐ duct [are] matters which are traditionally left to wide discre‐ tion of a sentencing court”
- noting that “evaluation of the character of the defendant and a prediction of future conduct [are] matters which aré traditionally left to wide discretion of a sentencing court”
- order denying defendant’s motion to retain expert witness
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PELL, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached in the opinion authored by Chief Judge Fairchild. Insofar, however, as that opinion is subject to being read as containing an inference that this court is expressing an opinion on the question of constitutional due process in the determination of special offender status under 18 U.S.C § 3575(b), I do not concur.
My lack of concurrence is not intended to express either agreement or disagreement with the scholarly analysis of the question of due process applicable to the determination of special offender status. It simply is that the precise issue, not briefed or argued in this court, is a complex one, intertwined as it is with the entire matter of sentencing, and from my point of view should not have been addressed at all in the present case.