finding reversible error when trial judge gave jury hypothetical which compared reasonable dpubt to hesitation a young couple might have when deciding to buy a new car, because “the illustration tends to denigrate the graver, more important transactions of life concept” (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- finding reversible error when trial judge gave jury hypothetical which compared reasonable dpubt to hesitation a young couple might have when deciding to buy a new car, because “the illustration tends to denigrate the graver, more important transactions of life concept” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- counsel “has a substantial and very important role to perform in raising mitigating factors ... to the court at sentencing”
- “Judicial attempts to clarify the meaning of the phrase ‘reasonable doubt’ by explanation, elaboration or illustration, as employed here, more often than not tend to confuse or mislead.”
- “Where the appellate court could only speculate as to what sentence the trial court would have imposed absent consideration of a count upon which the conviction or sentence is later vacated, a remand for resentencing on the remaining, valid counts is appropriate.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part):
I join in Part II of the majority opinion, remanding for resentencing on counts 2 and 3:
On count 1, I would remand for resentencing, and dissent from reversal for a new trial.
I do not believe the difficulty with the reasonable doubt charge is plain error warranting reversal in the absence of objection at trial. The opinion claims the jury was confused as to what is meant by reasonable doubt. Its message to trial judges is to parrot a few abstractions that are well and good for appellate opinions but not really enlightening to jurors. Every time a trial judge gives examples of what might cause reasonable men to hesitate to act, it is possi *1252 ble for someone — certainly appellate counsel — to show that this specific instance does not adequately define the universe of important transactions. I would be readier to join if the majority adopted Judge Pell’s suggestion that the best thing to do is merely to- state that the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without adding another word. United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 , 95 S.Ct. 1446 , 43 L.Ed.2d 762 (1974).
The charge before us is not as objectionable as that in the Scurry case, where the trial judge instructed it was enough for conviction if the jury would be willing to act on such evidence in the important affairs of life. Yet that was held not plain error warranting reversal in the absence of trial objection. Scurry v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 374 , 347 F.2d 468 , cert. denied, 389 U.S.- 883, 88 S.Ct. 139 , 19 L.Ed.2d 179 (1967). Here ¡if anything the trial judge was even more favorable to the defendant than the law requires, as a matter of logic and syntax. For his instruction overall communicated the impression that there was reasonable doubt if there was enough doubt about a matter to prompt hesitation and discussion, whereas the law is that even where a situation is well worthy of pause and discussion, there may be a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if after such discussion the jurors would not hesitate to act.
What counts is the impact of the charge taken as a whole. I do not think it plain that this charge resonated in the courtroom overall as permitting a conviction even though jurors would have hesitated to act in the important affairs of life. If defense counsel had presented an objection, the trial judge would have' promptly clarified matters to avoid any possible ambiguity. If the problems — discerned by the majority — had been perceived by defense counsel or the trial judge they could have been avoided. It seems unlikely to me that they steered the jury away from the explicit message that the trial judge was impressing on the jury to be fair to defendant, and not to convict if there was a kind of doubt that would cause them to hesitate to act in a matter they considered..important.