case remanded because, although trial judge "clearly considered FYCA sentencing,” he did not explicitly find that the youth offender would "not derive benefit from treatment under the Act” as is required under Dorszynski
How later courts described this case
- case remanded because, although trial judge "clearly considered FYCA sentencing,” he did not explicitly find that the youth offender would "not derive benefit from treatment under the Act” as is required under Dorszynski
- requirement of express finding of no benefit ensures not only that sentencing court is aware of FYCA “but also that it focused on amenability to treatment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBB, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Since the District Court did not make an explicit finding that Hopkins would not benefit from sentencing as a youth offender I acquiesce in the remand. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 , 94 S.Ct. 3042 , 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974). I do not concur in the part of the majority opinion which examines and evaluates the reports and information which were before the sentencing judge, and directs him to reconsider the sentence.
Apparently dissatisfied with the reasoning of the district judge and the sentence he imposed the majority directs him to reconsider. In my opinion this direction and the justification for it advanced by the majority are unwarranted attempts to escape the narrow limitations placed on appellate review of sentences by the Dorszynski decision. I cannot approve such an intrusion into the exclusive discretionary power of the district judge. “Once it is made clear that the sentencing judge has considered the option of treatment under the Act and rejected it . . .no appellate review is warranted.” Dorszynski v. United States at 443, 94 S.Ct. at 3053 .