concluding that because "the individual plaintiffs had standing to bring th[e] suit,” the presence of a party arguably lacking in standing would not "lessen the controversy, or blur the presentation of issues, or alter the course of the litigation in any way”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that because "the individual plaintiffs had standing to bring th[e] suit,” the presence of a party arguably lacking in standing would not "lessen the controversy, or blur the presentation of issues, or alter the course of the litigation in any way”
- noting that delegates are selected through a process that is “virtually (or even officially) [one] of appointment by party officials”
- holding that individual political party members had standing to challenge national party delegate allocation formula
- noting in the context of nominating convention that "[i]f the right to vote is a right to true participation in the elective process, then it is heavily implicated in the nomination process"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MacKINNON, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
In my opinion, the Ripon Society has no standing to bring this suit, and I would therefore direct the dismissal of the complaint as to it. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 224 , 94 S.Ct. 2925 , 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 , 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1368 , 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (“[A] mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to *590 [confer standing on the organization.]”). Of course, the presence of the individual plaintiffs, who do have standing, means that Ripon’s lack of standing is not fatal to this action.
With the above exception, I concur in Judge McGowan’s opinion.