Opinion

Mona Bronson v. Board of Education of the City School District of Cincinnati, Its Members, Etal.

  • 525 F.2d 344
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Oct 30, 1975
Status
Published
Author
Weick
On the bench
Phillips, Weick, Lively
Cited by
60 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.0%

finding no manifest injustice where litigant “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue”

How later courts described this case

  • finding no manifest injustice where litigant “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue”
  • collateral estoppel not to be applied rigidly

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Bronson v. Board of Education, 535 F. Supp. 846 (1982)

    They have not asserted, nor has the Court discovered any reason, based on Columbus or Dayton II or any other authority, for departing from the Sixth Circuit’s preliminary determination in Bronson that the more comprehensive rules of res judicata are inapplicable to this case.
    District Court, S.D. OhioFeb 11, 1982Read it

The opinion

WEICK, Circuit Judge

(dissenting).

The petition for rehearing filed by the Board requests that we clarify our resolution of certain questions in this case in order to provide necessary guidance for the District Court upon the remand.

In my dissenting opinion I specifically pointed out the parts in both majority and concurring opinions with which I disagreed. It is obvious that I agreed with the part of the majority opinion “that Deal I and II continue to have ‘vitality.’ ” Our recent decision, in which two members of the present panel participated, in Higgins v. Board of Educ. of Grand Rapids, 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974), is further proof of that fact.

I also stated in my dissent:

The Board can be held accountable only for any new acts and conduct subsequent to the cut off date of July 16, 1965 and not authorized or approved in Deal.

This clearly agrees with the holding in the majority opinion that the District Court’s order precludes plaintiffs from attempting to prove that the Board, pri- or to the cut-off date, acted with a segregative intent or that its prior actions, inactions or policies violated the constitutional rights of minority pupils or their parents.

In my opinion, children who came into the Cincinnati School System after the cut-off date take the system as they find it, just like the other children who are *361 attending the schools, and they are bound by our decisions in Deal I and Deal II.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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