Opinion

In the Matter of Arthur Lawrence Abrams, an Attorney-At-Law

  • 521 F.2d 1094
  • 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 13931
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Jun 30, 1975
Status
Published
Author
Van Dusen
On the bench
Seitz, Van Dusen, Aldisert, Adams, Rosenn, Hunter, Weis
Cited by
71 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.0%

recognizing the "absolute and unfettered power" of the federal courts to admit and discipline members of its bar independently and separately from admission and disciplinary procedures of the state courts

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing the "absolute and unfettered power" of the federal courts to admit and discipline members of its bar independently and separately from admission and disciplinary procedures of the state courts
  • power of federal district court to discipline its attorneys may be limited to the extent the district court relies on the state’s legal or factual determination
  • controlling decision of New Jersey Supreme Court could not be disregarded “with fealty to consistency”
  • reversing sanctions order for failing to follow local rule specifying disciplinary procedures

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by In Re Culpepper, 770 F. Supp. 366 (1991)

    The facts underlying the Abrams decision are inapposite to Olkon’s situation.
    District Court, E.D. MichiganJul 15, 1991Read it

The opinion

VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge

(concurring and dissenting):

While joining in the separate opinion of Judge Adams for reversal and remand due to Local Rules 7(2)(d) and 7(4), I find this an exceedingly close case as to whether affirmance is required on this record, as contended in the United States Attorney’s brief, and respectfully state these views not stated in Judge Adams’ opinion. I emphasize the majority’s language that “the starting point for analysis is the unquestioned principle that the District Court of New Jersey, like all federal courts, has the power both to prescribe requirements for admission to practice before that court and to discipline attorneys who have been admitted to practice before that court” (p. 1099) and that its discipline “may be at variance with that taken by the state court system” (p. 1102). 1 See In re Fleck, 419 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1969).

The district court is entitled to regulate its bar, inter alia, in order to assure proper advocacy to assist it in the conduct of its judicial functions. In Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 50 , 37 S.Ct. 377, 378 , 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917), the Court emphasized “the condition of fair private and professional character, without the possession of which there could be -no possible right to continue to be a member of this Bar.”

. In the case of Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 , 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824), from which the majority quotes at page 1099 of its opinion, the Court stated:

“If there be a revising tribunal, which possesses controlling authority, that tribunal will always feel the delicacy of interposing its authority, and would do so only in a plain case. Some doubts are felt in this court respecting the extent of its authority as to the conduct of the circuit and district courts towards their officers; but without deciding on this question, the court is not inclined to interpose, unless it were in a case where the conduct of the circuit or district court was irregular, or was flagrantly improper.”

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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