noting that mandamus is appropriate "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction” *311 and “to confine the lower court to the sphere of its discretionary power” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- noting that mandamus is appropriate "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction” *311 and “to confine the lower court to the sphere of its discretionary power” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
- noting that mandamus is appropriate "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction" and "to confine the lower court to the sphere of its discretionary power" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
- concluding that even if the court found that the district judge had abused his discretion, the petitioner was not “automatically ... entitled to the ... Writ.”
- “the Supreme Court has said that it ‘plainly dispenses with any requirement that the intervenor shall have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the litigation.’” (quoting SEC. v. U.S. Realty & Imp. Co., 310 U.S. 434, 459 , 60 S.Ct. 1044, 1055 , 84 L.Ed.1293 (1940))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GODBOLD, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part):
I concur in the conclusion in Part II of Judge Tuttle’s opinion that mandamus should be denied. My analysis is, however, slightly different.
While petitioner employs the rubric of abuse of discretion it seems to me that this case does not fall neatly within that category. Rather petitioner’s basic contention is that as a matter of law (and *488 not as a matter of discretion granted to the court under Rule 24) 1 the District Court was required to deny the petition of the United States to intervene. I would phrase that matter of law as being the question of whether the United States had the requisite interest to satisfy Rule 24. This threshold question of law is decided one way or the other like any other question of law, with no discretion involved. If the court decided that the government did possess the necessary interest, then the discretion provided by Rule 24 would come into play.
Thus the issue is not the trial judge’s range of discretion, see S.E.C. v. Krentzman, 397 F.2d 55 (CA5, 1968), but an alleged error of law antecedent to any exercise of discretion. The coincidental existence of discretion in Rule 24 should not lead us to review by mandamus the antecedent question of law under the abuse of discretion rubric. A ruling on a question of law may be challenged as so egregiously erroneous that the court’s action should be deemed a usurpation of power. See United States Alkali Exp. Asso. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 , 65 S.Ct. 1120 , 89 L.Ed. 1554 (1945); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 , 85 S.Ct. 234 , 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964). Such an extremely bad judicial decision might justify mandamus under the rubric of “usurpation.” De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 , 65 S.Ct. 1130 , 89 L.Ed. 1566, 1572 (1945). The question presented here is a close one. The trial judge’s decision, if erroneous, was not so egregious as to constitute a usurpation of power.
Moreover, to the degree that usurpation may turn not on the closeness of the legal question but rather on the adverse effects on the aggrieved party, cf., De Beers Consol. Mines, supra, petitioner here is suffering no consequences of the type and magnitude that should cause us to exercise our power to issue extraordinary writs. Petitioner is in court as a defendant, and presumably he must go through trial in any event. While he objects to being subjected to discovery at the behest of the United States, the other parties plaintiff unquestionably have the identical right, though possibly not the same means and manpower, to pursue discovery.
Whatever the ultimate decision on the merits of this case, the question of the propriety of intervention by the United States can be considered on appellate review in the usual course of litigation.
I agree that interference by mandamus at this stage of these proceedings would be improper.
. That discretion goes to the convenience of the parties, the smooth functioning of the courts, the fairness of intervention to each of the parties, and like factors.