concluding that the name of the authorizing official was “not as likely” to affect the judicial determination of whether to approve an application for an intercept than the determination of the facts, such as probable cause
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the name of the authorizing official was “not as likely” to affect the judicial determination of whether to approve an application for an intercept than the determination of the facts, such as probable cause
- concluding that suppression was not required for violating Section 2518(4)(d) because the facts as they actually existed showed substantial compliance with the statute
- permitting affidavits first presented at the suppression hearing to demonstrate that an appropriate official actually authorized the application
- where an appropriate DOJ official approved wiretap application in fact, but a DOJ official not authorized to approve the application signed the approval memorandum, holding violation too “technical” to require suppression
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ADAMS, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the result reached by the majority.
Like Judge Hunter, I conclude that evidence derived from a court-approved wiretap may not be suppressed under 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (10)(a)(ii) where, as here, the wiretap has in fact been authorized by a Justice Department official empowered to do so under 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1), and the only defect in the authorization procedure is in the identification of the authorizing officer.
Since the then Attorney General authorized the challenged wiretaps, I find it unnecessary to decide the further legal question whether an Acting Assistant Attorney General is “responsive to the political process” 1 and thus empowered by 28 U.S.C. § 2516 (1) to authorize wiretaps.
. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 520 , 94 S.Ct. 1820 , 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974).