holding that “the right to practice any of the common occupations of life, and for others to engage the individual to perform those acts which are his occupation” are rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
How later courts described this case
- holding that “the right to practice any of the common occupations of life, and for others to engage the individual to perform those acts which are his occupation” are rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
- holding that a podiatrist’s application for staff privileges at a public hospital for purposes of engaging in his occupation as a podiatrist involved a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
- finding that a physician, “in seeking staff privileges at [a] hospital, seeks to engage in his occupation ... and this is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
- finding a deprivation of a liberty interest when a podiatrist could not practice medicine practice at all because statutory restrictions on podiatrists meant he could not obtain staff privileges at a hospital
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the opinion and the result. I would emphasize, however, that in the procedural due process hearing the intrinsic reasonableness of the regulation is the principal matter for inquiry.
While I would join in the Court’s conclusion that the practice of podiatry and medicine do not coalesce, the practice of podiatry is a statutorily recognized right to engage in procedures and techniques which might be characterized as “medically radical”. The State of Georgia recognizes that persons of this profession have significant professional qualifications, responsibilities, and privileges.
Considering all that Georgia permits and encourages them to do, the question perhaps boils down to whether any rational basis exists for denying podiatrists, or more important their patients, the essential facilities of a twentieth century hospital. Before podiatrists can be relegated in the performance of their duties to a garret, there must be a rational basis for regulations which effectively deny access to modern hospital facilities. The due process hearing, if conducted with due process, may therefore precipitate a serious question of equal protection.