recognizing the impropriety of employing a rigid sentencing policy as opposed to approaching each defendant as an individual, but concluding that the defendant’s argument took the sentencing judge’s words out of context
How later courts described this case
- recognizing the impropriety of employing a rigid sentencing policy as opposed to approaching each defendant as an individual, but concluding that the defendant’s argument took the sentencing judge’s words out of context
- Although majority held that there was a requirement for individualized sentencing, it concluded that the district judge had satisfied it; the Honorable J. Edward Lumbard disagreed with their assessment of the facts in the particular case and set forth the requirement for individualized sentencing in detail.
- Lumbard J., dissenting; Woolsey v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143-145 (8th Cir. 1973). We are aware that United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Chief Judge
(concurring):
My dissenting brother has taken this opportunity to express at some length his condemnation of uniform or mechanical sentencing policies, while noting with approval the goal of individualized sentencing. Were it not for the facts of this ease, I would not hesitate to join in Judge Lumbard’s opinion for there can *362 be no dispute with his statement of elementary principles which are to govern every sentence. But, his exposition of the philosophical underpinnings of sentencing policy must not obscure the requisite analysis of the facts before us. Thus, for the reasons stated in the opinion of my brother Timbers, I am of the view that Judge Wyatt did not, in fact, follow a uniform sentencing policy for selective service cases, nor did he fail to consider Baker’s violation in the context of the particular circumstances in which it was committed. Accordingly, I join Judge Timbers in affirming the judgment of conviction.