The opinion
TIMBERS, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in the judgment of the Court which affirms appellant’s conviction for refusal to report for induction into the armed forces of the United States.
I also concur in so much of the majority opinion as is necessary to reach that result.
With respect to one aspect of the majority opinion which I regard as unnecessary to reach that result and therefore to be dictum, I respectfully dissent.
Specifically, the majority states that “a bare claim of extreme hardship to named dependents [need not] always be regarded as conclusive on a request for reopening made after an induction notice has been mailed.” (emphasis in original). Although the majority disavows, by footnote, any intention to reach *987 that result in a case where there is no evidence that the hardship claim is frivolous, the negative pregnant of such statement suggests that there are or may be some situations in which unsupported allegations made after the induction notice has been mailed will require reopening. I disagree.
While we never have ruled upon this specific issue with respect to a hardship claim, we have held that a post-induction notice claim of conscientious objection must be supported by evidence — -not allegations — before the board is required to reopen a registrant’s classification. United States v. Jones, 433 F.2d 1292 , 1293-94 n. 6 (2 Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971); Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (2 Cir. 1970).
Although several circuits have held that an undocumented claim of hardship —as opposed to one of conscientious objection — is sufficient to require reopening, e. g., Grosfield v. Morris, 448 F.2d 1004, 1011-13 (4 Cir. 1971), such a result would appear to be contrary to the command of 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1972). That regulation precludes reopening “unless the local board specifically finds there has been a change in the registrant’s status . . . . ” (emphasis added). This requirement is juxtaposed to that applicable to a pre-in-duction notice request for reclassification. The latter requires only the presentation of facts which, if true, would warrant reclassification. If bare allegations were to be viewed as sufficient to require reopening in some post-induction notice situations, the effect would be twofold: (1) the board would be unable to make specific findings because it necessarily would lack information essential to this threshold determination; and (2) board procedures would be the same for both pre and post induction notice requests for reclassification contrary to the plain command of the regulation.
I therefore would leave that issue for determination in a case where it is squarely presented by the record and is necessary to the result. This is not that case.