upholding as reason- able under the Fourth Amendment a government employer's elec- tronic surveillance of an employee that yielded evidence of criminal misconduct, based upon the relationship of the search to the employ- ee's work duties
How later courts described this case
- upholding as reason- able under the Fourth Amendment a government employer's elec- tronic surveillance of an employee that yielded evidence of criminal misconduct, based upon the relationship of the search to the employ- ee's work duties
- holding that government employee had a right to privacy in his private office
- “We believe this element of work-relatedness is where” the line of reasonableness “must be drawn”
- electronic surveillance of IRS employee to verify whether he was properly performing IRS work in his IRS office not unreasonable
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STEVENS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
The lawyer, not the client, is primarily responsible for avoiding conflicts of interest. Indeed, in numerous situations the client may be unaware of the potential conflict; in others, he might reasonably assume that the conflict is unobjectionable. In such cases, compliance with § 207(a) is solely the responsibility of the lawyer; since the client’s consent is then merely an element of the lawyer’s crime, it does not create a conspiracy. Cf. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 119-123 , 53 S.Ct. 35 , 77 L.Ed. 206 .
But there are cases in which the client’s involvement is of critical importance. If the client knows the disqualifying chapter in the lawyer’s history, and also is conscious of the illegal character of the employment, and nevertheless retains him, it is probable that he is motivated by a desire to obtain an advantage that the law specifically forbids. In such a case the client’s intent, unlike the mere acquiescence of the concubine, characterizes a bargain which is more corrupt than the substantive offense itself. Such a bargain, in my opinion, is a conspiracy within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 371 . United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 145 , 35 S.Ct. 271 , 59 L.Ed. 504 . 1
In this case the jury found that the lawyer and his client were partners in such a corrupt bargain. Comments by *1126 the client acknowledging the retainer and its illegal character were therefore against his penal interest and admissible against the lawyer. See Rule 804(b)(4) and Advisory Committee note thereon, Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates. Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 . Hauff’s declarations to Weber, Hanel, McAdams, and Circella, which were only admitted against Hauff, would not violate Nasser’s right of confrontation as interpreted in Bruton v. United States if they were either admissible against Nasser “under traditional rules of evidence,” see 391 U.S. 123 , 128 n. 3, 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , or if their trustworthiness is otherwise supported by adequate “indicia of reliability.” See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 , 91 S. Ct. 210 , 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart). Since it seems unlikely that the impact of Hauff’s declarations on the jury was disproportionate to their reliability, I question the validity of the Bruton objection to most of those declarations.
I concur in part IA, IB, IC, V and VI of Judge Fairchild’s opinion.
. Gebardi involved mere “concurrence without more,” see 287 U.S. at 120, 121, 122, 123 , 53 S.Ct. 35 ; Holte was distinguished, not overruled. In this case, however, the client’s wrongful intent is not an element of the lawyer’s substantive offense.