holding that presumably protected student speech cannot be prohibited by the school unless there are “facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities”
How later courts described this case
- holding that presumably protected student speech cannot be prohibited by the school unless there are “facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities”
- analyzing student newspaper published off-campus and occasionally taken on-campus by others under Tinker while noting that “it is not at all unusual to allow the geographical location of the actor to determine the constitutional protection that should be afforded to his or her acts”
- explaining that the parents filed the lawsuit in “objecti[on] to the school board’s bootstrap transmogrification into Super- Parent”
- holding school’s literature distribution policy was unconstitutional, in part due to lack of time period during which request had to be reviewed
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLARK, Circuit Judge
(specially concurring) :
I concur in all of Judge Goldberg’s opinion except that portion of Part II holding that due process requires that school authorities not only provide a prompt administrative decisionmaking process for regulation of student expression, but also that they must create an administrative appellate mechanism as a part of such review process.
Although I agree that if school authorities provide for administrative appeals, such appeals must be prompt in decision and reasonable in procedure, I do not agree that such administrative appeal procedures are constitutionally bound to exist.