determining that there was no conversion although the plaintiffs documents were copied and copies were given to and published by the press and that conversion could not be established where “intermeddling falls short of the complete or very substantial deprivation of possessory rights in the property”
How later courts described this case
- determining that there was no conversion although the plaintiffs documents were copied and copies were given to and published by the press and that conversion could not be established where “intermeddling falls short of the complete or very substantial deprivation of possessory rights in the property”
- recognizing tort of intrusion in general
- “The measure of damages in trespass is ... the actual diminution of [] value caused by the [defen dant’s] interference.”
- “[w]here the intermeddling falls short of the complete or very substantial deprivation of possessory rights in the property, the tort committed is not conversion”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TAMM, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
Some legal scholars will see in the majority opinion — as distinguished from its actual holding — an ironic aspect. Conduct for which a law enforcement officer would be soundly castigated is, by the phraseology of the majority opinion, found tolerable; conduct which, if engaged in by government agents would lead to the suppression of evidence obtained by these means, is approved when used for the profit of the press. There is an anomaly lurking in this situation: the news media regard themselves as quasi-public institutions yet they demand immunity from the restraints which they vigorously demand be placed on government. That which is regarded as a mortal taint on information secured by any illegal conduct of government would appear from the majority opinion to be permissible as a technique or modus oper-andi for the journalist. Some will find this confusing, but I am not free to act on my own views under the doctrine of *709 stare decisis which I consider binding upon me.
I concur, therefore, in Judge Wright’s disposition of this case albeit I have some difficulty in concluding that the appellee would be without legal remedy if the entire factual situation herein were before us on pleadings encompassing all possible legal aspects suggested by the facts. Our review is, however, confined to a limited area, compressed by the amended complaint, restricted by certain stipulations, and curbed by our consideration only of the propriety of the trial court’s action upon a motion for summary judgment. We must predicate our judgment upon the record as it comes to us, not upon some theoretical or philosophical idea of what the record might have been had the pleadings and the record in the trial court presented us with a wide latitude for study and a multiple selection of possible dispositions. Upon the present record we have more voice than power.