holding that “in order to be deemed a ‘prevailing party[,]’ a plaintiff [must] have obtained a court order carrying sufficient ‘judicial imprimatur’ to materially change the legal relationship of the parties.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “in order to be deemed a ‘prevailing party[,]’ a plaintiff [must] have obtained a court order carrying sufficient ‘judicial imprimatur’ to materially change the legal relationship of the parties.”
- noting that “to demonstrate that it is a ‘prevailing party,’ an EAJA applicant must show that it obtained an enforceable judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties, or the equivalent of either of those”
- stating that, depending on the context and effect of the order, a remand to an administrative agency can constitute prevailing on the merits
- prevailing party status “requires a plaintiff to have obtained a court order carrying sufficient ‘judicial imprimatur’ to materially change the legal relationship of the parties. Enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees clearly meet this threshold. The threshold can also be met by other court action ‘equivalent’ to a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DYK, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion, and write separately only to emphasize that the voluntary abandonment of challenged conduct will not always and automatically preclude the award of attorney’s fees. As Buck-hannon itself recognized, there may be circumstances in which a continuing controversy will exist despite the claimed voluntary abandonment; the merits of the case will be decided; and the winning party will be entitled to prevailing party status. Thus in Buckhannon, the Court stated:
It is well settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice unless it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. If a case is not found to be moot, and the plaintiff later procures an enforceable judgment, the court may of course award attorney’s fees.
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 , 121 S.Ct. 1835 , 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
The majority here correctly concludes that this is not such a case. There was no settlement agreement leading to the entry of an enforceable decree, and the Court of Federal Claims entered an injunctive order without deciding the merits. Under such circumstances, I agree that there is no entitlement to fees.