explaining that deferring to state-court decision that doesn't resolve particular federal claim "upsets the 'delicate balance' struck by AEDPA between vindicating the rights of criminal defendants and upholding the authority of state courts as the primary forum for adjudicating these rights" (quoting Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) )
How later courts described this case
- explaining that deferring to state-court decision that doesn't resolve particular federal claim "upsets the 'delicate balance' struck by AEDPA between vindicating the rights of criminal defendants and upholding the authority of state courts as the primary forum for adjudicating these rights" (quoting Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) )
- explaining that attorney-client privilege “does not protect disclosure of the underlying 16 facts, so long as the underlying facts can be proven without resort to the privileged materials”
- holding that a constitutional principle is not clearly established where the Supreme Court has expressly concluded that the issue is an “open question”
- denying habeas relief in part because “no Supreme Court case has directly addressed the potential conflict between state-law attorney-client privilege and the Confrontation Clause”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
THOMAS, Circuit Judge,
with whom
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting:
As Judge Tashima has pointed out, the California Court of Appeal referenced Murdoch’s Confrontation Clause argument in its decision and discussed the attorney-client privilege in quoting People v. Godlewski, 17 Cal.App.4th 940 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 800 (1993). Assuming, arguendo, that the last reasoned state court opinion decided the Confrontation Clause argument on the merits, and that our review is therefore not de novo, I would still conclude that Murdoch is entitled to federal habeas relief.
For the reasons articulated by Chief Judge Kozinski, the California Court of Appeal decision was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States in a long series of cases, including Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 , 85 S.Ct. 1074 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). Thus, I join parts 2(a)-(e) and part 3 of Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent.