explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is 4 However, “state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the ‘official’ nature of their acts.” See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is 4 However, “state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the ‘official’ nature of their acts.” See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”
- explaining " For example, after listing 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2), which prohibits debt collectors from using obscene or profane language when collecting a debt, Minor states, ‘““Use of obscene or profane language on my report (saying I owe you a debt).” (Doc. 1 at 18). Minor does not specify what language was obscene or profane, nor does she even identify the report on which the language supposedly appeared. Page 14 of 16 that “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” are insufficient to establish a claim for relief
- finding the following similar allegations conclusory: that particular defendants 7 “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [plaintiff]’ to harsh 8 conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or 9 national origin and for no legitimate penological interest’”; and that defendant “Ashcroft was the 10 ‘principal architect’ of this invidious policy and [defendant] Mueller was ‘instrumental’ in 11 adopting and executing it” (internal citations omitted)
- finding the following similar allegations conclusory: that particular defendants “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [plaintiff]’ to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest’ and that defendant “Ashcroft was the ‘principal architect’ of this invidious policy and [defendant] Mueller was ‘instrumental’ in adopting and executing it” (internal citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97 (2014)
We have not yet determined the contours of the supervisory liability test, including the gross negligence prong, after Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 676-77, 129 S.Ct. 1937; see Reynolds, 685 F.3d at 205-06 n. 14 (casting doubt on the continuing vitality of each prong of the supervisory liability test).
Questioned by K.D. ex rel. Duncan v. White Plains School District, 921 F. Supp. 2d 197 (2013)
While the Iqbal decision calls into question several of the categories of supervisory liability enumerated by the Second Circuit in Colon, the Circuit has thus far declined to resolve the conflicting interpretations of the surviving Colon grounds among the district courts.
Questioned by Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F. Supp. 2d 317 (2010)
- U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) arguably casts in doubt the continued viability of some of the categories set forth in
Questioned by Festa v. Jordan, 803 F. Supp. 2d 319 (2011)
While the Third Circuit has “expressed uncertainty as to the viability and scope of supervisory liability” after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) see Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (3d Cir.2011) (internal citations omitted), for purposes of this motion, the continued validity of imposing liability on a superviso…
Questioned by Carpenter v. City of New York, 984 F. Supp. 2d 255 (2013)
The Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, which found that a supervisor can be held liable only "through the official’s own individual actions,” id. at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, arguably casts doubt on the continued viability of some of the categories set forth in Has
Questioned by Faiaz v. Colgate University, 64 F. Supp. 3d 336 (2014)
See also Young v. Choinski, 15 F.Supp.3d 172, 186-89 (D.Conn.2014) (“Although Iqbal does arguably cast doubt on the viability of certain categories of supervisory liability, where the Second Circuit has not revisited the criteria for supervisory liability, this Court will continue to recognize and apply the Colon factors.”).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Walker v. Schult, 365 F. Supp. 3d 266 (2019)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.").
Distinguished by Simpson v. Phila. Sheriff's Office, 351 F. Supp. 3d 919 (2019)
Pa. Mar. 21, 2016) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher , 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) ); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to...§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.").
Distinguished by Sinfuego v. Curry Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 360 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (2018)
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens [v.Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) ] and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."); Bd. of Cty.
Distinguished by Batson v. Hoover, 355 F. Supp. 3d 604 (2018)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.").
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
dissenting.
I agree with Justice Souter and join his dissent. I write separately to point out that, like the Court, I believe it important to prevent unwarranted litigation from interfering with “the proper execution of the work of the Government.” Ante, at 685. But I cannot find in that need adequate justification for the Court’s interpretation of Bell *700 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The law, after all, provides trial courts with other legal weapons designed to prevent unwarranted interference. As the Second Circuit explained, where a Government defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, a trial court, responsible for managing a case and “mindful of the need to vindicate the purpose of the qualified immunity defense,” can structure discovery in ways that diminish the risk of imposing unwarranted burdens upon public officials. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F. 3d 143, 158 (2007). A district court, for example, can begin discovery with lower level Government defendants before determining whether a case can be made to allow discovery related to higher level Government officials. See ibid. Neither the briefs nor the Court’s opinion provides convincing grounds for finding these alternative case-management tools inadequate, either in general or in the case before us. For this reason, as well as for the independently sufficient reasons set forth in Justice Souter’s opinion, I would affirm the Second Circuit.