holding that, in the statutory phrase “with per-pupil expenditures . . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures in the State,” “[t]he word ‘such’ refers to ‘per-pupil expenditures’”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, in the statutory phrase “with per-pupil expenditures . . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures in the State,” “[t]he word ‘such’ refers to ‘per-pupil expenditures’”
- holding, inter alia, that the question of weight of evidence is reserved exclusively for the trier of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and free to determine the credibility of witnesses
- observing that Supreme Court precedent “is full of statements such as “We begin, as always, with the language of the statute,’ Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001), and replete with the affirmation that, when ‘[g]iven [a] straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history,’ United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997).”
- departing from the normal order for statutory interpretation, i.e., an order that begins with the statutory language, and examining first the provision’s background and basic purposes, because of the technical nature of the language in question
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*123 Justice Souter,
dissenting.
I agree with the Court that Congress probably intended, or at least understood, that the Secretary would continue to follow the methodology devised prior to passage of the current statute in 1994, see ante, at 90-91. But for reasons set out in Justice Scalia’s dissent, I find the statutory language unambiguous and inapt to authorize that methodology, and I therefore join Part I of his dissenting opinion.