holding that the determination of whether a weapon was "brandished" to support the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence was a sentencing factor to be found by the trial court, and the plurality explaining that a judge may determine a fact increasing the minimum sentence within the statutory maximum because the jury verdict already authorizes the sentence
How later courts described this case
- holding that the determination of whether a weapon was "brandished" to support the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence was a sentencing factor to be found by the trial court, and the plurality explaining that a judge may determine a fact increasing the minimum sentence within the statutory maximum because the jury verdict already authorizes the sentence
- holding that a fact that increases the lower limit of the sentencing range, but not the upper limit, need not be found by the jury under Apprendi because [t]he Fifth and Sixth Amendments ensure that the defendant "will never get more punishment than he bargained for when he did the crime, but they do not promise that he will receive anything less than that"
- holding that Apprendi did not apply to the two-year increase in the defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence for brandishing a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime because “the facts guiding judicial discretion below the statutory maximum need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt”
- holding sentencing judge did not violate defendant's constitutional rights in making a finding on the preponderance of the evidence that increased the statutory minimum sentence because the sentence imposed fell within the statutory maximum prescribed for the crime of which the defendant had been properly convicted
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 179, expressly overruled).
Overruled by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
While Thompson asks us, in effect, to find that Harris has been implicitly overruled by Blakely and Booker, we do not have the authority to do that.
Overruled — as noted by 3 later courts
In affirming the constitutionality of N.J.S.A 2C:43-6(b), however, Abdullah relied on two cases that are no longer good law -- Harris, which has been explicitly overruled by Alleyne, and State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75, 820 A.2d 637 (2003), which has been **442implicitly overruled by both Alleyne and Grate.6 See id. at 512, 878 A.2d 746.
3 citing opinionsOverruled by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2004)
ment that can be imposed ... under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).” (citing United States v. Wade, 318 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that Harris confined the constitutional requirements of Apprendi to factors that increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the otherwise-applicable statutory maximum))); United States v. Bowen, 194 Fed.Appx. 393, 404 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that the court could “see no reason to hold…
Questioned by United States v. Aguilar, 83 F. App'x 610 (2003)
536 U.S. 545, 556, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), calls into question
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Gurley, 860 F. Supp. 2d 95 (2012)
McMillan and Harris are distinguishable from the case at hand as well.
Distinguished by State v. Clarke, 134 P.3d 188 (2006)
[5] The dissent argues that McMillan and Harris are distinguishable from this case because the mandatory minimum sentencing schemes at issue in those cases operated "`solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding."' Dissent at 197 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 2411).
Distinguished by State v. Luckey, 366 N.J. Super. 79 (2004)
Accepting the Petrucci conclusion that Stanton and Harris are distinguishable from Johnson and Petrucci, because of the quantum of the ineligibility term required to be served, and that the Harris principle adopted and accepted by the majority in Stanton is not applicable when service of more than 50% of the sentence is required, Petrucci does not require a different result in this case.
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I cannot easily _ distinguish Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), from this case in terms of logic. For that reason, I cannot agree with the plurality’s opinion insofar as it finds such a distinction. At the same time, I continue to believe that the Sixth Amendment permits judges to apply sentencing factors — whether those factors lead to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum (as in Apprendi) or the application of a mandatory minimum (as here). And because I believe that extending Apprendi to mandatory mínimums would have adverse practical, as well as legal, consequences, I cannot yet accept its rule. I therefore join the Court’s *570 judgment, and I join its opinion to the extent that it holds that Apprendi does not apply to mandatory minimums.
In saying this, I do not mean to suggest my approval of mandatory minimum sentences as a matter of policy. During the past two decades, as mandatory minimum sentencing statutes have proliferated in number and importance, judges, legislators, lawyers, and commentators have criticized those statutes, arguing that they negatively affect the fair administration of the criminal law, a matter of concern to judges and to legislators alike. See, e. g., Remarks of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Nat. Symposium on Drugs and Violence in America 9-11 (June 18, 1993); Kennedy, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 29.(Mar. 9, 1994) (mandatory minimums are “imprudent, unwise and often an unjust mechanism for sentencing”); Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 14 Crim. Justice 28 (Spring 1999); Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 185 , 192-196 (1993); Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 199 (1993); Raeder, Rethinking Sentencing and Correctional Policy for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 14 Crim. Justice 1, 53 (Summer 1999) (noting that the American Bar Association has opposed mandatory minimum sentences since 1974).
Mandatory minimum statutes are fundamentally inconsistent with Congress’ simultaneous effort to create a fair, honest, and rational sentencing system through the use of Sentencing Guidelines. Unlike Guideline sentences, statutory, mandatory minimums generally deny the judge the legal power to depart downward, no matter how unusual the special circumstances that call for leniency. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U. S. 120, 132-133 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 95-96 (1996). They rarely reflect an ef *571 fort to achieve sentencing proportionality — a key element of sentencing fairness that demands that the law punish a drug “kingpin” and a “mule” differently. They transfer sentencing power to prosecutors, who can determine sentences through the charges they decide to bring, and who thereby have reintroduced much of the sentencing disparity that Congress created Guidelines to eliminate. U. S. Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System i-iv, 31-33 (1991) (Sentencing Report); see also Schulhofer, supra, at 214-220. They rarely are based upon empirical study. See Rehnquist, supra, at 9-10; Hatch, supra, at 198. And there is evidence that they encourage subterfuge, leading to more frequent downward departures (on a random basis), thereby making them a comparatively ineffective means of guaranteeing tough sentences. See Sentencing Report 53.
Applying Apprendi in this case would not, however, lead Congress to abolish, or to modify, mandatory minimum sentencing statutes. Rather, it would simply require the prosecutor to charge, and the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the “factor,” say, the amount of unlawful drugs, that triggers the mandatory minimum. In many cases, a defendant, claiming innocence and arguing, say, mistaken identity, will find it impossible simultaneously to argue to the jury that the prosecutor has overstated the drug amount. How, the jury might ask, could this “innocent” defendant know anything about that matter? The upshot is that in many such cases defendant and prosecutor will enter into a stipulation before trial as to drug amounts to be used at sentencing (if the jury finds the defendant guilty). To that extent, application of Apprendi would take from the judge the power to make a factual determination, while giving that power not to juries, but to prosecutors. And such consequences, when viewed through the prism of an open, fair sentencing system, are seriously adverse.
*572 The legal consequences of extending Apprendi to the mandatory minimum sentencing context are also seriously adverse. Doing so would diminish further Congress’ otherwise broad constitutional authority to define crimes through the specification of elements, to shape criminal sentences through the specification of sentencing factors, and to limit judicial discretion in applying those factors in particular cases. I have discussed these matters fully in my Apprendi dissent. See 530 U. S., at 555 . For the reasons set forth there, and in other opinions, see Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227, 254 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224 (1998), I would not apply Apprendi in this case.
I consequently join Parts I, II, and IV of the Court’s opinion and concur in its judgment.