holding that the determination of whether a weapon was "brandished" to support the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence was a sentencing factor to be found by the trial court, and the plurality explaining that a judge may determine a fact increasing the minimum sentence within the statutory maximum because the jury verdict already authorizes the sentence
How later courts described this case
- holding that the determination of whether a weapon was "brandished" to support the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence was a sentencing factor to be found by the trial court, and the plurality explaining that a judge may determine a fact increasing the minimum sentence within the statutory maximum because the jury verdict already authorizes the sentence
- holding that a fact that increases the lower limit of the sentencing range, but not the upper limit, need not be found by the jury under Apprendi because [t]he Fifth and Sixth Amendments ensure that the defendant "will never get more punishment than he bargained for when he did the crime, but they do not promise that he will receive anything less than that"
- holding that Apprendi did not apply to the two-year increase in the defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence for brandishing a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime because “the facts guiding judicial discretion below the statutory maximum need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt”
- holding sentencing judge did not violate defendant's constitutional rights in making a finding on the preponderance of the evidence that increased the statutory minimum sentence because the sentence imposed fell within the statutory maximum prescribed for the crime of which the defendant had been properly convicted
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 179, expressly overruled).
Overruled by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
While Thompson asks us, in effect, to find that Harris has been implicitly overruled by Blakely and Booker, we do not have the authority to do that.
Overruled — as noted by 3 later courts
In affirming the constitutionality of N.J.S.A 2C:43-6(b), however, Abdullah relied on two cases that are no longer good law -- Harris, which has been explicitly overruled by Alleyne, and State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75, 820 A.2d 637 (2003), which has been **442implicitly overruled by both Alleyne and Grate.6 See id. at 512, 878 A.2d 746.
3 citing opinionsOverruled by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2004)
ment that can be imposed ... under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).” (citing United States v. Wade, 318 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that Harris confined the constitutional requirements of Apprendi to factors that increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the otherwise-applicable statutory maximum))); United States v. Bowen, 194 Fed.Appx. 393, 404 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that the court could “see no reason to hold…
Questioned by United States v. Aguilar, 83 F. App'x 610 (2003)
536 U.S. 545, 556, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), calls into question
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Gurley, 860 F. Supp. 2d 95 (2012)
McMillan and Harris are distinguishable from the case at hand as well.
Distinguished by State v. Clarke, 134 P.3d 188 (2006)
[5] The dissent argues that McMillan and Harris are distinguishable from this case because the mandatory minimum sentencing schemes at issue in those cases operated "`solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding."' Dissent at 197 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 2411).
Distinguished by State v. Luckey, 366 N.J. Super. 79 (2004)
Accepting the Petrucci conclusion that Stanton and Harris are distinguishable from Johnson and Petrucci, because of the quantum of the ineligibility term required to be served, and that the Harris principle adopted and accepted by the majority in Stanton is not applicable when service of more than 50% of the sentence is required, Petrucci does not require a different result in this case.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
concurring.
Petitioner bases his statutory argument that brandishing must be interpreted as an offense element on Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227 (1999). He bases his constitutional argument that regardless of how the statute is interpreted, brandishing must be charged in the indictment and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000). As I dissented in Jones and Ap-prendi and still believe both were wrongly decided, I find it easy to reject petitioner’s arguments. Even assuming the validity of Jones and Apprendi , however, I agree that petitioner’s arguments that brandishing must be charged in the indictment and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt are unavailing. I therefore join Justice Kennedy’s opinion in its entirety.'