finding that a remand order based on abstention principles constituted a final judgment for the purpose of reviewability because, inter alia, (1) “the district court disassociate^] itself from the case entirely, retaining nothing of the matter on the federal court’s docket” and (2) the order “conclusively determined] an issue that is separate from the merits, namely, the question whether the federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of comity and federalism”
How later courts described this case
- finding that a remand order based on abstention principles constituted a final judgment for the purpose of reviewability because, inter alia, (1) “the district court disassociate^] itself from the case entirely, retaining nothing of the matter on the federal court’s docket” and (2) the order “conclusively determined] an issue that is separate from the merits, namely, the question whether the federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of comity and federalism”
- recognizing that Burford abstention is appropriate where the action involves “ ‘difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import,’” or where the exercise of federal review “ ‘would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern’” (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976))
- explaining the historic framework for abstention and noting that the Supreme Court’s abstention jurisprudence “reflect[s] a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system, where by the federal courts, exercising a wise discretion, restrain their authority because of scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that the district court erred in remanding to state court, under Burford, a common-law suit for contract and tort damages, in part because an abstention-based dismissal historically has been appropriate only where a federal court was sitting in equity; the Supreme Court declined to consider whether an abstention-based stay order would have been proper
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bankruptcy Estate of Morgantown Excavators, Inc. v. Huntington National Bank (In re Bankruptcy Estate of Morgantown Excavators, Inc.), 507 B.R. 126 (2014)
Id. Things Remembered, which was decided one year before Quackenbush, is distinguishable from this case because it dealt with a procedural issue.
Distinguished by W.R. Huff Asset Management Co. v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 566 F.3d 979 (2009)
fall into either category of remand order described in § 1447(c),” 517 U.S. at 712, 116 S.Ct. at 1718, and thus § 1447(d) was inapplicable.
Distinguished by Official Plan Committee of Omniplex Communications Group v. Lucent Tech., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (2004)
Cases such as Quackenbush, however, are distinguishable in that they involve discretionary remand orders; as already explained, a remand order under § 1334(c)(2) is mandatory.
Distinguished by Coles v. Street, 38 F. App'x 829 (2002)
517 U.S. 706, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996), is distinguishable from and not applicable to this case.
The opinion
*733 Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
When this suit first was filed, it raised an unsettled but since resolved question of California law concerning the ability of companies in Allstate’s position to set off claims held against Mission. The principal reason for the District Court’s decision to dismiss the case was the threat posed to the state proceedings by different state and federal rulings on the question. The court’s concern was reasonable. States, as a matter of tradition and express federal consent, have an important interest in maintaining precise and detailed regulatory schemes for the insurance industry. See, e. g., the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33 , as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. The fact that a state court rather than an agency was chosen to implement California’s scheme provided more reason, not less, for the federal court to stay its hand.
At the same time, however, we have not considered a case in which dismissal of a suit for damages by extension of the doctrine of Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), was held to be authorized and necessary. As the Court explains, no doubt the preferred course in such circumstances is to resolve any serious potential for federal intrusion by staying the suit while retaining jurisdiction. We ought not rule out, though, the possibility that a federal court might dismiss a suit for damages in a case where a serious affront to the interests of federalism could be averted in no other way. We need not reach that question here.
Abstention doctrines are a significant contribution to the theory of federalism and to the preservation of the federal system in practice. They allow federal courts to give appropriate and necessary recognition to the role and authority of the States. The duty to take these considerations into account must inform the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Principles of equity thus are not the sole foundation for abstention rules; obligations of comity, and respect for the *734 appropriate balance between state and federal interests, are an important part of the justification and authority for abstention as well. See, e. g., id., at 334 (“[A] sound respect for the independence of state action requires the federal equity court to stay its hand”); Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 44 (1971) (rooting abstention in “a proper respect for state functions” and “sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments”); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976) (abstention doctrines are based on “considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state relations”). See also Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543, 551-552 (1985). The traditional role of discretion in the exercise of equity jurisdiction makes abstention easiest to justify in cases where equitable relief is sought, but abstention, including dismissal, is a possibility that may yet be addressed in a suit for damages, if fundamental concerns of federalism require us to face the issue.
With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.