finding that a remand order based on abstention principles constituted a final judgment for the purpose of reviewability because, inter alia, (1) “the district court disassociate^] itself from the case entirely, retaining nothing of the matter on the federal court’s docket” and (2) the order “conclusively determined] an issue that is separate from the merits, namely, the question whether the federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of comity and federalism”
How later courts described this case
- finding that a remand order based on abstention principles constituted a final judgment for the purpose of reviewability because, inter alia, (1) “the district court disassociate^] itself from the case entirely, retaining nothing of the matter on the federal court’s docket” and (2) the order “conclusively determined] an issue that is separate from the merits, namely, the question whether the federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of comity and federalism”
- recognizing that Burford abstention is appropriate where the action involves “ ‘difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import,’” or where the exercise of federal review “ ‘would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern’” (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976))
- explaining the historic framework for abstention and noting that the Supreme Court’s abstention jurisprudence “reflect[s] a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system, where by the federal courts, exercising a wise discretion, restrain their authority because of scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that the district court erred in remanding to state court, under Burford, a common-law suit for contract and tort damages, in part because an abstention-based dismissal historically has been appropriate only where a federal court was sitting in equity; the Supreme Court declined to consider whether an abstention-based stay order would have been proper
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bankruptcy Estate of Morgantown Excavators, Inc. v. Huntington National Bank (In re Bankruptcy Estate of Morgantown Excavators, Inc.), 507 B.R. 126 (2014)
Id. Things Remembered, which was decided one year before Quackenbush, is distinguishable from this case because it dealt with a procedural issue.
Distinguished by W.R. Huff Asset Management Co. v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 566 F.3d 979 (2009)
fall into either category of remand order described in § 1447(c),” 517 U.S. at 712, 116 S.Ct. at 1718, and thus § 1447(d) was inapplicable.
Distinguished by Official Plan Committee of Omniplex Communications Group v. Lucent Tech., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (2004)
Cases such as Quackenbush, however, are distinguishable in that they involve discretionary remand orders; as already explained, a remand order under § 1334(c)(2) is mandatory.
Distinguished by Coles v. Street, 38 F. App'x 829 (2002)
517 U.S. 706, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996), is distinguishable from and not applicable to this case.
The opinion
Justice Scalia,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. I write separately only to respond to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
Justice Kennedy, while joining the opinion of the Court, says that he would “not rule out . . . the possibility that a federal court might dismiss a suit for damages in a case where a serious affront to the interests of federalism could be averted in no other way,” post, at 733. I would not have joined today’s opinion if I believed it left such discretionary *732 dismissal available. Such action is foreclosed, I think, by the Court’s holding, clearly summarized in the concluding sentences of the opinion: “Under our precedents, federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary. Because this was a damages action, we conclude that the District Court’s remand order was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine.” Ante, at 731.
Justice Kennedy’s projected horrible of a “serious affront to the interests of federalism” cannot possibly materialize under the Court’s holding. There is no “serious affront to the interests of federalism” when Congress lawfully decides to pre-empt state action — which is what our cases hold (and today’s opinion affirms) Congress does whenever it instructs federal courts to assert jurisdiction over matters as to which relief is not discretionary.
If the Court today felt empowered to decide for itself when congressionally decreed jurisdiction constitutes a “serious affront” and when it does not, the opinion would have read much differently. Most pertinently, it would not have found it unnecessary “to inquire fully as to whether this case presents the sort of ‘exceptional circumstance’ in which Burford abstention or other grounds for yielding federal jurisdiction might be appropriate.” Ibid. There were certainly grounds for such an inquiry if we thought it relevant. The “[then] unsettled but since resolved question of California law” to which Justice Kennedy refers, post, at 733, was only part of the basis for the District Court’s decision to remand to state court; the court also pointed more generally to what it thought was the State’s “overriding interest in regulating insurance insolvencies and liquidations in a uniform and orderly manner,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. As the Court’s opinion says, it is not necessary to inquire fully into that matter because this was a damages action.