Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doe

How later courts described this case

• explaining that jurists, when reviewing ordinary economic and social legislation, are not charged with judging “the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices,” nor does “the judiciary sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations;” rather, the courts must enforce a constitutionally-valid statute as drafted by the legislature
• stating that “courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature’s generaliza- tions even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends . . . [and a] classification does not fail rational-basis review because it is not made with mathematical nicety” (internal quotation marks omitted)
• concluding that, even if allow- ing parents and guardians to participate in a commitment proceeding increased the likelihood of commitment, those persons’ participation in the hearing did not increase the risk of an inaccurate determination and thus did not bear on the second Mathews factor
• explaining that “a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose”

Written by the judges who cited it.