explaining that jurists, when reviewing ordinary economic and social legislation, are not charged with judging “the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices,” nor does “the judiciary sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations;” rather, the courts must enforce a constitutionally-valid statute as drafted by the legislature
How later courts described this case
- explaining that jurists, when reviewing ordinary economic and social legislation, are not charged with judging “the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices,” nor does “the judiciary sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations;” rather, the courts must enforce a constitutionally-valid statute as drafted by the legislature
- stating that “courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature’s generaliza- tions even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends . . . [and a] classification does not fail rational-basis review because it is not made with mathematical nicety” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- concluding that, even if allow- ing parents and guardians to participate in a commitment proceeding increased the likelihood of commitment, those persons’ participation in the hearing did not increase the risk of an inaccurate determination and thus did not bear on the second Mathews factor
- explaining that “a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with Justice Souter that Kentucky’s differential standard of proof for committing the mentally ill and the mentally retarded is irrational and therefore join Part II of his opinion. I conclude, however, that there is a rational basis for permitting close relatives and guardians to participate as parties in proceedings to commit the mentally retarded but not the mentally ill. As the Court points out, there are sufficiently plausible and legitimate reasons for the legislative determination in this area. I also agree with the Court that allowing guardians and immediate family members to participate as parties in commitment proceedings does not violate procedural due process. Like my colleagues, I would not reach the question whether heightened equal protection scrutiny should be applied to the Kentucky scheme.