concluding that ordinance was motivated by animosity toward Santería religion when record demonstrated that various city officials had made critical statements to public about Santería religion and had indicated that devotees of that religion were “in violation of everything this country stands for,” that Bible did not allow Sant-ería practices, that Santería religion was “a sin, foolishness, an abomination to the Lord, and the worship of demons,” and that community would not tolerate religious practices that were abhorrent to citizens [internal quotation marks omitted]
How later courts described this case
- concluding that ordinance was motivated by animosity toward Santería religion when record demonstrated that various city officials had made critical statements to public about Santería religion and had indicated that devotees of that religion were “in violation of everything this country stands for,” that Bible did not allow Sant-ería practices, that Santería religion was “a sin, foolishness, an abomination to the Lord, and the worship of demons,” and that community would not tolerate religious practices that were abhorrent to citizens [internal quotation marks omitted]
- holding that law prohibiting the religious sacrifice could not be regarded as serving a compelling interest when it left “appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited” when it permitted the unregulated slaughter of animals in a variety of other contexts such as hunting and extermination, which undermined the government’s assertion that the compelling interest was the prevention of cruelty of animals and the health risk posed by the improper disposal of animal carcasses
- holding that, although "Establishment Clause cases . . . have often stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general," it is the "Free Exercise Clause [that] is dispositive" when what is at issue is not a "governmental effort[] to benefit religion or particular religions" but rather "an attempt to disfavor . . . religion"
- holding that a facially neutral city ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice and intended , to target .the Sante-ría faith violated the Free Exercise Clause because “the Free Exercise Clause, like the. Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination” .and action targeting religion.“cannot be shielded by .mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Miller v. Davis — not on the Supreme Court's list
508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993), superseded in part by statute as stated in Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924
Limited by Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
He contends that under the rule we enunciated in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, supra, the program is presumptively unconstitutional because it is not facially neutral with respect, to religion.3 We reject his claim of presumptive unconstitutionality, however; to do otherwise would extend the Lukumi line of cases well beyond not only their facts but their reasoning.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education, 876 F. Supp. 2d 419 (2012)
Defendants have elaborated on their argument that Lukumi is inapplicable for purposes of the pending cross-motions for summary judgment, but the Court remains unpersuaded.
Distinguished by Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283 (2004)
Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520, is inapposite.
Distinguished by No. 98-1986, 178 F.3d 57 (1999)
Fourth, the primary case cited by the parents, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993), is inapposite.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
with whom
Justice O’Connor joins, concurring in the judgment.
The Court holds today that the city of Hialeah violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments when it passed a set of restrictive ordinances explicitly directed at petitioners’ religious practice. With this holding I agree. I write separately to emphasize that the First Amendment’s protection of religion extends beyond those rare occasions on which the government explicitly targets religion (or a particular reli *578 gion) for disfavored treatment, as is done in this case. In my view, a statute that burdens the free exercise of religion “may stand only if the law in general, and the State’s refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means.” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 907 (1990) (dissenting opinion). The Court, however, applies a different test. It applies the test announced in Smith , under which “a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Ante, at 531. I continue to believe that Smith was wrongly decided, because it ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative individual liberty and treated the Free Exercise Clause as no more than an antidiscrimination principle. See 494 U. S., at 908-909 . Thus, while I agree with the result the Court reaches in this case, I arrive at that result by a different route.
When the State enacts legislation that intentionally or unintentionally places a burden upon religiously motivated practice, it must justify that burden by “showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div,, 450 U. S. 707, 718 (1981). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 215 (1972). A State may no more create an underinclusive statute, one that fails truly to promote its purported compelling interest, than it may create an overinclusive statute, one that encompasses more protected conduct than necessary to achieve its goal. In the latter circumstance, the broad scope of the statute is unnecessary to serve the interest, and the statute fails for that reason. In the former situation, the fact that allegedly harmful conduct falls outside the statute’s scope belies a governmental assertion that it has genuinely pursued an interest “of the highest order.” Ibid. If the State’s goal is important enough to prohibit religiously motivated activity, it *579 will not and must not stop at religiously motivated activity. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 390 (1978) (invalidating certain restrictions on marriage as “grossly underinelusive with respect to [their] purpose”); Supreme Court of N. H. v. Piper, 470 U. S. 274, 285, n. 19 (1985) (a rule excluding nonresidents from the bar of New Hampshire “is under-inclusive . . . because it permits lawyers who move away from the State to retain their membership in the bar”).
In this case, the ordinances at issue are both overinclusive and underinclusive in relation to the state interests they purportedly serve. They are overinclusive, as the majority correctly explains, because the “legitimate governmental interests in protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals could be addressed by restrictions stopping far short of a flat prohibition of all Santería sacrificial practice.” Ante, at 538. They are underinclusive as well, because “[d]espite the city’s proffered interest in preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice.” Ante, at 543. Moreover, the “ordinances are also underinclusive with regard to the city’s interest in public health ....” Ante, at 544.
When a law discriminates against religion as such, as do the ordinances in this case, it automatically will fail strict scrutiny under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 402-403, 407 (1963) (holding that governmental regulation that imposes a burden upon religious practice must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest). This is true because a law that targets religious practice for disfavored treatment both burdens the free exercise of religion and, by definition, is not precisely tailored to a compelling governmental interest.
Thus, unlike the majority, I do not believe that “[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.” Ante, at 546. In my view, regulation that targets religion in this way, ipso facto, fails strict scrutiny. It is for this reason *580 that a statute that explicitly restricts religious practices violates the First Amendment. Otherwise, however, a[t]he First Amendment... does not distinguish between laws that are generally applicable and laws that target particular religious practices.” Smith, 494 U. S., at 894 (opinion concurring in judgment).
It is only in the rare case that a state or local legislature will enact a law directly burdening religious practice as such. See ibid. Because respondent here does single out religion in this way, the present ease is an easy one to decide.
A harder ease would be presented if petitioners were requesting an exemption from a generally applicable anti-cruelty law. The result in the case before the Court today, and the fact that every Member of the Court concurs in that result, does not necessarily reflect this Court’s views of the strength of a State’s interest in prohibiting cruelty to animals. This case does not present, and I therefore decline to reach, the question whether the Free Exercise Clause would require a religious exemption from a law that sincerely pursued the goal of protecting animals from cruel treatment. The number of organizations that have filed amicus briefs on behalf of this interest, * however, demonstrates that it is not a concern to be treated lightly.
See Brief for Washington Humane Society in support of Respondent; Brief for People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, New Jersey Animal Rights Alliance, and Foundation for Animal Rights Advocacy in support of Respondent; Brief for Humane Society of the United States, American Humane Association, American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc., and Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in support of Respondent; Brief for the International Society for Animal Rights, Citizens for Animals, Farm Animal Reform Movement, In Defense of Animals, Performing Animal Welfare Society, and Student Action Corps for Animals in support of Respondent; and Brief for the Institute for Animal Rights Law, American Fund for Alternatives to Animal Research, Farm Sanctuary, Jews for Animal Rights, United Animal Nations, and United Poultry Concerns in support of Respondent.