concluding that ordinance was motivated by animosity toward Santería religion when record demonstrated that various city officials had made critical statements to public about Santería religion and had indicated that devotees of that religion were “in violation of everything this country stands for,” that Bible did not allow Sant-ería practices, that Santería religion was “a sin, foolishness, an abomination to the Lord, and the worship of demons,” and that community would not tolerate religious practices that were abhorrent to citizens [internal quotation marks omitted]
How later courts described this case
- concluding that ordinance was motivated by animosity toward Santería religion when record demonstrated that various city officials had made critical statements to public about Santería religion and had indicated that devotees of that religion were “in violation of everything this country stands for,” that Bible did not allow Sant-ería practices, that Santería religion was “a sin, foolishness, an abomination to the Lord, and the worship of demons,” and that community would not tolerate religious practices that were abhorrent to citizens [internal quotation marks omitted]
- holding that law prohibiting the religious sacrifice could not be regarded as serving a compelling interest when it left “appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited” when it permitted the unregulated slaughter of animals in a variety of other contexts such as hunting and extermination, which undermined the government’s assertion that the compelling interest was the prevention of cruelty of animals and the health risk posed by the improper disposal of animal carcasses
- holding that, although "Establishment Clause cases . . . have often stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general," it is the "Free Exercise Clause [that] is dispositive" when what is at issue is not a "governmental effort[] to benefit religion or particular religions" but rather "an attempt to disfavor . . . religion"
- holding that a facially neutral city ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice and intended , to target .the Sante-ría faith violated the Free Exercise Clause because “the Free Exercise Clause, like the. Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination” .and action targeting religion.“cannot be shielded by .mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Miller v. Davis — not on the Supreme Court's list
508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993), superseded in part by statute as stated in Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924
Limited by Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
He contends that under the rule we enunciated in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, supra, the program is presumptively unconstitutional because it is not facially neutral with respect, to religion.3 We reject his claim of presumptive unconstitutionality, however; to do otherwise would extend the Lukumi line of cases well beyond not only their facts but their reasoning.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education, 876 F. Supp. 2d 419 (2012)
Defendants have elaborated on their argument that Lukumi is inapplicable for purposes of the pending cross-motions for summary judgment, but the Court remains unpersuaded.
Distinguished by Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283 (2004)
Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. 520, is inapposite.
Distinguished by No. 98-1986, 178 F.3d 57 (1999)
Fourth, the primary case cited by the parents, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993), is inapposite.
The opinion
Justice Scalia,
with whom
The Chief Justice joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
The Court analyzes the “neutrality” and the “general applicability” of the Hialeah ordinances in separate sections (Parts II-A and II-B, respectively), and allocates various invalidating factors to one or the other of those sections. If it were necessary to make a clear distinction between the two terms, I would draw a line somewhat different from the Court’s. But I think it is not necessary, and would frankly acknowledge that the terms are not only “interrelated,” ante, at 531, but substantially overlap.
The terms “neutrality” and “general applicability” are not to be found within the First Amendment itself, of course, but are used in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), and earlier cases to describe those characteristics which cause a law that prohibits an activity a particular individual wishes to engage in for religious reasons nonetheless not to constitute a “law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. In my view, the defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to those laws that by their terms impose disabilities on the basis of religion (e. g., a law excluding members of a certain sect from public benefits, cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978)), see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693, 703-704 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C. J.); whereas the defect of lack of general applicability applies primarily to those laws which, though neutral in their terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement target the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory treatment, see Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953). But certainly a law that is not of general applicability (in the sense *558 I have described) can be considered “nonneutral”; and certainly no law that is nonneutral (in the relevant sense) can be thought to be of general applicability. Because I agree with most of the invalidating factors set forth in Part II of the Court’s opinion, and because it seems to me a matter of no consequence under which rubric (“neutrality,” Part II-A, or “general applicability,” Part II-B) each invalidating factor is discussed, I join the judgment of the Court and all of its opinion except section 2 of Part II-A.
I do not join that section because it departs from the opinion’s general focus on the object of the laws at issue to consider the subjective motivation of the lawmakers, i. e., whether the Hialeah City Council actually intended to disfavor the religion of Santería. As I have noted elsewhere, it is virtually impossible to determine the singular “motive” of a collective legislative body, see, e. g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 636-639 (1987) (dissenting opinion), and this Court has a long tradition of refraining from such inquiries, see, e. g., Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130-131 (1810) (Marshall, C. J.); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383-384 (1968).
Perhaps there are contexts in which determination of legislative motive must be undertaken. See, e. g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946). But I do not think that is true of analysis under the First Amendment (or the Fourteenth, to the extent it incorporates the First). See Edwards v. Aguillard, supra, at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The First Amendment does not refer to the purposes for which legislators enact laws, but to the effects of the laws enacted: “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]....” This does not put us in the business of invalidating laws by reason of the evil motives of their authors. Had the Hialeah City Council set out resolutely to suppress the practices of Santería, but ineptly adopted ordinances that failed to do so, I do not see how those laws could be said to “prohibi[t] the free exercise” of *559 religion. Nor, in my view, does it matter that a legislature consists entirely of the purehearted, if the law it enacts in fact singles out a religious practice for special burdens. Had the ordinances here been passed with no motive on the part of any councilman except the ardent desire to prevent cruelty to animals (as might in fact have been the case), they would nonetheless be invalid.