Opinion

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez

  • 494 U.S. 259
  • 110 S. Ct. 1056
  • 108 L. Ed. 2d 222
  • 1990 U.S. LEXIS 1175
  • 1990 WL 16772
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Feb 28, 1990
Status
Published
Author
Blackmun
On the bench
Stevens', Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
Cited by
716 cases

explaining that the Constitution’s use of the phrase “the people” in the First Amendment “sug- gests that ‘the people’ protected by” that amendment “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 35 AKHMETSHIN v. BROWDER 563 Cite as 983 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2020) connection with this country to be consid- ered part of that community”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that the Constitution’s use of the phrase “the people” in the First Amendment “sug- gests that ‘the people’ protected by” that amendment “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 35 AKHMETSHIN v. BROWDER 563 Cite as 983 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2020) connection with this country to be consid- ered part of that community”
  • holding that the Fourth Amendment protects only “the people” of the United States and has no application to search-and-seizure challenges where the challenger is a non-citizen/non-resident alien with no 39 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 40 of 97 voluntary attachment to the United States and the area searched is located outside of the United States
  • explaining that several factors counsel against overseas application of the warrant requirement including: “the absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials”
  • explaining that the Constitution’s use of the phrase “the people” in the First Amendment “suggests that ‘the people’ protected by” that amendment “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice Blackmun,

dissenting.

I cannot accept the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, echoed in some portions of Justice Brennan’s dissent, that the Fourth Amendment governs every action by an American official that can be characterized as a search or seizure. American agents acting abroad generally do not purport to exercise sovereign authority over the foreign nationals with whom they come in contact. The relationship between these agents and foreign nationals is therefore fundamentally different from the relationship between United States officials and individuals residing within this country.

I am inclined to agree with Justice Brennan, however, that when a foreign national is held accountable for purported violations of United States criminal laws, he has effectively been treated as one of “the governed” and therefore is entitled to Fourth Amendment protections. Although the Government’s exercise of power abroad does not ordinarily implicate the Fourth Amendment, the enforcement of domestic criminal law seems to me to be the paradigmatic exercise of sovereignty over those who are compelled to obey. In any event, as Justice Stevens notes, ante, at 279, respondent was lawfully (though involuntarily) within this country at the time the search occurred. Under these circumstances I believe that respondent is entitled to invoke protections of the Fourth Amendment. I agree with the Government, however, that an American magistrate’s lack of power to authorize a search abroad renders the Warrant Clause inapplicable to the search of a noncitizen’s residence outside this country.

The Fourth Amendment nevertheless requires that the search be “reasonable.” And when the purpose of a search is *298 the procurement of evidence for a criminal prosecution, we have consistently held that the search, to be reasonable, must be based upon probable cause. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of probable cause, and I do not believe that a reliable determination could be made on the basis of the record before us. I therefore would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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