United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez

Justice Stevens’

concurrence in the judgment takes the view that even though the search -took place in Mexico, it is nonetheless governed by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment because respondent was “lawfully present in the United States . . . even though he was brought and held here against his will.” Post, at 279. But this sort of presence— lawful but involuntary — is not of the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country. The extent to which respondent might claim the protection of the Fourth Amend *272 ment if the duration of his stay in the United States were to be prolonged — by a prison sentence, for example — we need not decide. When the search of his house in Mexico took place, he had been present in the United States for only a matter of days. We do not think the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the search of premises in Mexico should turn on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the custodian of its nonresident alien owner had or had not transported him to the United States at the time the search was made.

The Court of Appeals found some support for its holding in our decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032 (1984), where a majority of Justices assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to illegal aliens in the United States. We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for placing some reliance on the case, but our decision did not expressly address the proposition gleaned by the court below. The question presented for decision in Lopez-Mendoza was limited to whether the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule should be extended to civil deportation proceedings; it did not encompass whether the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to illegal aliens in this country. The Court often grants certiorari to decide particular legal issues while assuming without deciding the validity of antecedent propositions, compare, e. g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980) (assuming State is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 ), with Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989) (State is not a “person”), and such assumptions — even on jurisdictional issues — are not binding in future cases that directly raise the questions. Id., at 63, n. 4 ; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 535, n. 5 (1974). Our statements in Lopez-Mendoza are therefore not dispositive of how the Court would rule on a Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens in the United States if such a claim were squarely before us. Even assuming such aliens would be entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, their situation is *273 different from respondent’s. The illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations; but respondent had no voluntary connection with this country that might place him among “the people” of the United States.

Respondent also contends that to treat aliens differently from citizens with respect to the Fourth Amendment somehow violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He relies on Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), and Foley v. Connelie, 435 U. S. 291 (1978), for this proposition. But the very cases previously cited with respect to the protection extended by the Constitution to aliens undermine this claim. They are constitutional decisions of this Court expressly according differing protection to aliens than to citizens, based on our conclusion that the particular provisions in question were not intended to extend to aliens in the same degree as to citizens. Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens”).

Not only are history and case law against respondent, but as pointed out in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 393 U. S. 763 (1950), the result of accepting his claim would have significant and deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting activities beyond its boundaries. The rule adopted by the Court of Appeals would apply not only to law enforcement operations abroad, but also to other foreign policy operations which might result in “searches or seizures.” The United States frequently employs Armed Forces outside this country — over 200 times in our history — for the protection of American citizens or national security. Congressional Research Service, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1989 (E. Collier ed. 1989). Application of the Fourth Amendment to those circumstances could significantly disrupt the ability of the political *274 branches to respond to foreign situations involving our national interest. Were respondent to prevail, aliens with no attachment to this country might well bring actions for damages to remedy claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in international waters. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971); cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989). Perhaps a Bivens action might be unavailable in some or all of these situations due to “‘special factors counselling hesitation,’” see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 298 (1983) (quoting Bivens, supra, at 396 ), but the Government would still be faced with case-by-case adjudications concerning the availability of such an action. And even were Bivens deemed wholly inapplicable in cases of foreign activity, that would not obviate the problems attending the application of the Fourth Amendment abroad to aliens. The Members of the Executive and Legislative Branches are sworn to uphold the Constitution, and they presumably desire to follow its commands. But the Court of Appeals’ global view of its applicability would plunge them into a sea of uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted abroad. Indeed, the Court of Appeals held that absent exigent circumstances, United States agents could not effect a “search or seizure” for law enforcement purposes in a foreign country without first obtaining a warrant — which would be a dead letter outside the United States —from a magistrate in this country. Even if no warrant were required, American agents would have to articulate specific facts giving them probable cause to undertake a search or seizure if they wished to comply with the Fourth Amendment as conceived by the Court of Appeals.

We think that the text of the Fourth Amendment, its history, and our cases discussing the application of the Constitution to aliens and extraterritorially require rejection of respondent’s claim. At the time of the search, he was a citizen and resident of Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the *275 United States, and the place searched was located in Mexico. Under these circumstances, the Fourth Amendment has no application.

For better or for worse, we live in a world of nation-states in which our Government must be able to “functio[n] effectively in the company of sovereign nations.” Perez v. Brownell, 356 U. S. 44, 57 (1958). Some who violate our laws may live outside our borders under a regime quite different from that which obtains in this country. Situations threatening to important American interests may arise halfway around the globe, situations which in the view of the political branches of our Government require an American response with armed force. If there are to be restrictions on searches and seizures which occur incident to such American action, they must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly

Reversed.