holding Burford abstention inappropriate because the plaintiffs’ case did not “involve a The counter-argument is, of course, that even if the tariffing state-law claim, nor even an assertion that the federal claims requirement established in the February 25 order were struck down once are in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must be the Commission approved an agreement incorporating the terms set forth untangled before the federal case can proceed”
How later courts described this case
- holding Burford abstention inappropriate because the plaintiffs’ case did not “involve a The counter-argument is, of course, that even if the tariffing state-law claim, nor even an assertion that the federal claims requirement established in the February 25 order were struck down once are in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must be the Commission approved an agreement incorporating the terms set forth untangled before the federal case can proceed”
- explaining that the "proper characterization” of a proceeding "depends not upon the character of the body but upon the character of the proceedings,” and holding that "a judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist,” while a legislative inquiry "looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter”
- determining that no intrusion into state affairs justifying Burford abstention would result from an examination of a state’s regulatory rate order, because although review “may, of course, result in an injunction against enforcement of the rate order, ... there is no doctrine requiring abstention merely because resolution of a federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy”
- explaining that "[w]hile Burford is concerned with protecting complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference, it does not require abstention whenever there exists such a process, or even in all cases where there is a 'potential for conflict' with state regulatory law or policy" (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 816 )
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated in part, on other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance, 517 U.S. 706 (1996) — not on the Supreme Court's list
491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) (“Our cases have long supported the proposition that federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred.” (citing cases)), abrogated in part on other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706
Distinguished
Distinguished by Aaron v. Target Corporation, 357 F.3d 768 (2004)
Appellants counter that they are inherently judicial and that NOPSI is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Employers Ass'n Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 19 F.3d 405 (1994)
Thus the plaintiff's citation of New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989), is inapposite, because that case has to do with Younger abstention.
The opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist,
concurring in Parts I and II-B and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that our prior cases extending Younger beyond criminal prosecutions to civil proceedings have limited its application to proceedings which are “judicial in nature,” and that, under our longstanding characterization of the distinction between “judicial” and “legislative” proceedings, see Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226 (1908), the Council’s ratemaking proceedings at issue here were not judicial in nature. Under these circum *374 stances, I agree that Younger abstention is inappropriate, despite the pendency of state-court review of the Council’s ratemaking order. Nothing in the Court’s opinion curtails our prior application of Younger to certain administrative proceedings which are “judicial in nature,” see Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U. S. 619 (1986); Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U. S. 423 (1982); nor does it alter our prior case law indicating that such proceedings should be regarded as “ongoing” for the purposes of Younger abstention until state appellate review is completed, see Dayton Christian Schools, supra, at 629. With this understanding, I join the portion of the Court’s opinion holding that Younger abstention is inappropriate here.
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that Burford abstention is inappropriate on the facts of this case. But I would not foreclose the possibility of Burford abstention in a case like this had the State consolidated review of the orders of local ratemaking bodies in a specialized state court with power to hear a federal pre-emption claim. Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment as to Burford abstention.