holding Burford abstention inappropriate because the plaintiffs’ case did not “involve a The counter-argument is, of course, that even if the tariffing state-law claim, nor even an assertion that the federal claims requirement established in the February 25 order were struck down once are in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must be the Commission approved an agreement incorporating the terms set forth untangled before the federal case can proceed”
How later courts described this case
- holding Burford abstention inappropriate because the plaintiffs’ case did not “involve a The counter-argument is, of course, that even if the tariffing state-law claim, nor even an assertion that the federal claims requirement established in the February 25 order were struck down once are in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must be the Commission approved an agreement incorporating the terms set forth untangled before the federal case can proceed”
- explaining that the "proper characterization” of a proceeding "depends not upon the character of the body but upon the character of the proceedings,” and holding that "a judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist,” while a legislative inquiry "looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter”
- determining that no intrusion into state affairs justifying Burford abstention would result from an examination of a state’s regulatory rate order, because although review “may, of course, result in an injunction against enforcement of the rate order, ... there is no doctrine requiring abstention merely because resolution of a federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy”
- explaining that "[w]hile Burford is concerned with protecting complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference, it does not require abstention whenever there exists such a process, or even in all cases where there is a 'potential for conflict' with state regulatory law or policy" (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 816 )
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated in part, on other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance, 517 U.S. 706 (1996) — not on the Supreme Court's list
491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) (“Our cases have long supported the proposition that federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred.” (citing cases)), abrogated in part on other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706
Distinguished
Distinguished by Aaron v. Target Corporation, 357 F.3d 768 (2004)
Appellants counter that they are inherently judicial and that NOPSI is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Employers Ass'n Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 19 F.3d 405 (1994)
Thus the plaintiff's citation of New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989), is inapposite, because that case has to do with Younger abstention.
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joins,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. I continue to adhere to my view, however, that the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Hams, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), is in general inapplicable to civil proceedings. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U. S. 1, 19 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434, 450 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 341 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592, 613 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).'