holding that complaints filed under the ADA must follow the same administrative exhaustion procedures as those filed under Title VII
How later courts described this case
- holding that complaints filed under the ADA must follow the same administrative exhaustion procedures as those filed under Title VII
- stating that "[w]e granted certiorari ... to resolve a Circuit conflict on when the statute of limitations period begins to run in a lawsuit arising out of a seniority system not alleged to be discriminatory on its face or as presently applied"
- observing that a discriminatory act occurs at the time of the discriminatory act, not when the consequences of the act start having a discriminatory effect, and holding that complaints concerning a seniority system occurred when the system was adopted with discriminatory intent
- rejecting the theoretical statutory construct that “to regard the employer as having been guilty of a continuing violation which ‘occurred,’ ... not only when the contractual right was eliminated but also when each of the concrete effects of that elimination was felt”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring.
Although I remain convinced that the Court misconstrued Title VII in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63 (1982), see id., at 86-90 (dissenting opinion), and in Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250 (1980), see id., at 265-267 (dissenting opinion), the Court has correctly applied those decisions to the case at hand. And it is the Court’s construction of the statute — rather than the views of an individual Justice — that becomes a part of the law. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U. S. 616, 644 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); Dougherty County Bd. of Education v. White, 439 U. S. 32, 47 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring). Accordingly, I join the Court’s opinion.