stating that the Board does not need to consider hardship to third parties other than the qualifying relatives delineated in the Act for purposes of deciding whether an alien is entitled to relief
How later courts described this case
- stating that the Board does not need to consider hardship to third parties other than the qualifying relatives delineated in the Act for purposes of deciding whether an alien is entitled to relief
- stating that, although “Congress has shown its willingness to redefine the term 18 ‘child’ on a number of occasions,” it has not “authorized [courts] to adopt a functional 19 definition”
- noting that Congress amended the INA to overrule INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 584, 78 L.Ed.2d 401 (1984), which had reached a seemingly harsh result regarding the "continuity of physical presence” requirement dictated by Congress’s plain language
- determining that the Congressional definition for a child in immigration cases is “unusually detailed and unyielding”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Marshall
dissents from this summary disposition, which has been ordered without affording the parties prior notice or an opportunity to file briefs on the merits. See, e. g., Acosta v. Louisiana Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 478 U. S. 251 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).