stating that, “[i]n cases involving the venire, this Court has found a prima facie case [of discrimination] on proof that members of the defendant’s race were substantially underrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn, and that the venire was selected under a practice providing ‘the opportunity for discrimination’ ”; adding that “[t]his combination of factors raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination because the Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of black citizens on a particular jury array where the selection mechanism is subject to abuse”
How later courts described this case
- stating that, “[i]n cases involving the venire, this Court has found a prima facie case [of discrimination] on proof that members of the defendant’s race were substantially underrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn, and that the venire was selected under a practice providing ‘the opportunity for discrimination’ ”; adding that “[t]his combination of factors raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination because the Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of black citizens on a particular jury array where the selection mechanism is subject to abuse”
- explaining that imposing the set-aside requirement upon prime contractors, and that such once the defendant has made a prima facie case, the State an affirmative discriminatory act does not exist in this case. Op. at 14. must come forth with a neutral explanation for striking a The dispute in this case is whether there wa s a discriminatory act. Thus, particular venireman
- holding that a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge based solely on the race of a potential juror constitutes a violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant and the challenged juror, and establishing a procedure for the trial court to use during jury selection for resolving objections to a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges on that basis
- explaining that “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination,” but also instructing that “a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination is not a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause’ (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled in part by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (Equal Protection Clause forbids State from challenging juror solely on account of race), overruled in part by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel.
Reported overruled in part by Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) — not on the Supreme Court's list
Purkett partially overruled Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 98, n. 20 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986), which required explanations for peremptory challenges to be clear, reasonably specific, and related to the case at hand.
Questioned by Dominguez v. State Farm Insurance Co., 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 2184 (1995)
Rehearing has been granted in that case, and the continued viability of religious Batson challenges is far from certain at this writing.
Declined to follow by State v. Adams, 533 So. 2d 1060 (1988)
We decline to extend the rule of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which prohibits the State from using its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, by prohibiting the State from exercising its peremptory challenges to eliminate all males from a female defendant's petit jury.
Declined to follow by State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158 (1990)
We decline to adopt this bright-line rule, especially in light of the fact that in Batson, the Court did not adopt such a rule, even though all four black members of the panel of prospective jurors were eliminated by the prosecutor's peremptory challenges.
Declined to follow by Ex Parte Lynn, 543 So. 2d 709 (1988)
Such a right of unlimited cross-examination would be a substantial expansion of the holding in Batson, supra, and we decline to adopt it.
and 9 more.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Wilson, 411 P.3d 11 (2012)
¶ 26 Further, the United States Supreme Court's discussion of the erroneous loss of peremptory challenges demonstrates that the Batson issue is distinguishable.
Distinguished by Constantino Carrera v. Robert Ayers, Jr., 670 F.3d 938 (2011)
Thus, Batson is inapplicable for the purpose of determining whether trial counsel’s performance in 1983 was deficient.
Distinguished by Robar v. LaBuda, 84 A.D.3d 129 (2011)
Petitioner argued that Batson was inapplicable but, at the court’s direction, provided reasons for striking these jurors, reasons which were unrelated to the jurors’ hunting experiences.
Distinguished by State v. Gordon, Unpublished Decision (9-26-2001) (2001)
We note that Batson is inapplicable to the instant case due to the fact that the two potential jurors were not excused via peremptory challenges, but rather for cause.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
concurring.
I concur in the Court’s opinion and judgment, but also agree with the views of The Chief Justice and Justice White that today’s decision does not apply retroactively.