Opinion

Batson v. Kentucky

  • 476 U.S. 79
  • 54 U.S.L.W. 4425
  • 106 S. Ct. 1712
  • 90 L. Ed. 2d 69
  • 1986 U.S. LEXIS 150
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Apr 30, 1986
Status
Published
Author
Stevens
On the bench
Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Burger, Rehnquist
Cited by
14,426 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.0%

Reported overruled in part by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list

stating that, “[i]n cases involving the venire, this Court has found a prima facie case [of discrimination] on proof that members of the defendant’s race were substantially underrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn, and that the venire was selected under a practice providing ‘the opportunity for discrimination’ ”; adding that “[t]his combination of factors raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination because the Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of black citizens on a particular jury array where the selection mechanism is subject to abuse”

How later courts described this case

  • stating that, “[i]n cases involving the venire, this Court has found a prima facie case [of discrimination] on proof that members of the defendant’s race were substantially underrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn, and that the venire was selected under a practice providing ‘the opportunity for discrimination’ ”; adding that “[t]his combination of factors raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination because the Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of black citizens on a particular jury array where the selection mechanism is subject to abuse”
  • explaining that imposing the set-aside requirement upon prime contractors, and that such once the defendant has made a prima facie case, the State an affirmative discriminatory act does not exist in this case. Op. at 14. must come forth with a neutral explanation for striking a The dispute in this case is whether there wa s a discriminatory act. Thus, particular venireman
  • holding that a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge based solely on the race of a potential juror constitutes a violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant and the challenged juror, and establishing a procedure for the trial court to use during jury selection for resolving objections to a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges on that basis
  • explaining that “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination,” but also instructing that “a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination is not a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause’ (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Reported overruled in part by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list

    See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (Equal Protection Clause forbids State from challenging juror solely on account of race), overruled in part by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel.
    Supreme Court of the United StatesApr 1, 19912 citing opinionsin partunconfirmed confidenceRead it
  • Reported overruled in part by Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) — not on the Supreme Court's list

    Purkett partially overruled Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 98, n. 20 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986), which required explanations for peremptory challenges to be clear, reasonably specific, and related to the case at hand.
    Supreme Court of the United StatesMay 15, 1995in partunconfirmed confidenceRead it
  • Questioned by Dominguez v. State Farm Insurance Co., 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 2184 (1995)

    Rehearing has been granted in that case, and the continued viability of religious Batson challenges is far from certain at this writing.
    Texas Court of Appeals, 8th District (El Paso)Sep 7, 1995Read it
  • Declined to follow by State v. Adams, 533 So. 2d 1060 (1988)

    We decline to extend the rule of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which prohibits the State from using its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, by prohibiting the State from exercising its peremptory challenges to eliminate all males from a female defendant's petit jury.
    Louisiana Court of AppealOct 27, 1988Read it
  • Declined to follow by State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158 (1990)

    We decline to adopt this bright-line rule, especially in light of the fact that in Batson, the Court did not adopt such a rule, even though all four black members of the panel of prospective jurors were eliminated by the prosecutor's peremptory challenges.
    Wisconsin Supreme CourtApr 2, 1990Read it
  • Declined to follow by Ex Parte Lynn, 543 So. 2d 709 (1988)

    Such a right of unlimited cross-examination would be a substantial expansion of the holding in Batson, supra, and we decline to adopt it.
    Supreme Court of AlabamaDec 30, 1988Read it

and 9 more.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by People v. Wilson, 411 P.3d 11 (2012)

    ¶ 26 Further, the United States Supreme Court's discussion of the erroneous loss of peremptory challenges demonstrates that the Batson issue is distinguishable.
    Colorado Court of AppealsOct 11, 2012Read it
  • Distinguished by Constantino Carrera v. Robert Ayers, Jr., 670 F.3d 938 (2011)

    Thus, Batson is inapplicable for the purpose of determining whether trial counsel’s performance in 1983 was deficient.
    Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitOct 4, 2011Read it
  • Distinguished by Robar v. LaBuda, 84 A.D.3d 129 (2011)

    Petitioner argued that Batson was inapplicable but, at the court’s direction, provided reasons for striking these jurors, reasons which were unrelated to the jurors’ hunting experiences.
    Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New YorkApr 28, 2011Read it
  • Distinguished by State v. Gordon, Unpublished Decision (9-26-2001) (2001)

    We note that Batson is inapplicable to the instant case due to the fact that the two potential jurors were not excused via peremptory challenges, but rather for cause.
    Ohio Court of AppealsSep 26, 2001Read it

The opinion

Justice Stevens,

with whom Justice Brennan joins,

concurring.

In his dissenting opinion, The Chief Justice correctly identifies an apparent inconsistency between my criticism of the Court’s action in Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U. S. 1050 (1986) (memorandum of Brennan, J., joined by Stevens, J.), and New Jersey v. T. L. O., 468 U. S. 1214 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) — cases in which the Court directed the State to brief and argue questions not presented in its petition *109 for certiorari — and our action today in finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause despite the failure of petitioner’s counsel to rely on that ground of decision. Post, at 115-116, nn. 1 and 2. In this case, however — unlike Connelly and T. L. O.— the party defending the judgment has explicitly rested on the issue in question as a controlling basis for affirmance. In defending the Kentucky Supreme Court’s judgment, Kentucky’s Assistant Attorney General emphasized the State’s position on the centrality of the equal protection issue:

“. . . Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the issue before this Court today is simply whether Swain versus Alabama should be reaffirmed. . . .

“. . .We believe that it is the Fourteenth Amendment that is the item that should be challenged, and presents perhaps an address to the problem. Swain dealt primarily with the use of peremptory challenges to strike individuals who were of a cognizable or identifiable group.

“Petitioners show no case other than the State of California’s case dealing with the use of peremptories wherein the Sixth Amendment was cited as authority for resolving the problem. So, we believe that the Fourteenth Amendment is indeed the issue. That was the guts and primarily the basic concern of Swain.

“In closing, we believe that the trial court of Kentucky and the Supreme Court of Kentucky have firmly embraced Swain, and we respectfully request that this Court affirm the opinion of the Kentucky court as well as to reaffirm Swain versus Alabama.” 1

In addition to the party’s reliance on the equal protection argument in defense of the judgment, several amici curiae *110 also addressed that argument. For instance, the argument in the brief filed by the Solicitor General of the United States begins:

«PETITIONER DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS DEPRIVED OF A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED PETIT JURY OR DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

“A. Under Swain v. Alabama A Defendant Cannot Establish An Equal Protection Violation By Showing Only That Black Veniremen Were Subjected To Peremptory Challenge By The Prosecution In His Case” 2

Several other amici similarly emphasized this issue. 3

In these circumstances, although I suppose it is possible that reargument might enable some of us to have a better informed view of a problem that has been percolating in the courts for several years, 4 I believe the Court acts wisely in *111 resolving the issue now on the basis of the arguments that have already been fully presented without any special invitation from this Court. 5

Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-28, 43.

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7.

The argument section of the brief for the National District Attorneys Association, Inc., as amicus curiae in support of respondent begins as follows:

“This Court should conclude that the prosecutorial peremptory challenges exercised in this case were proper under the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause and the sixth amendment. This Court should further determine that there is no constitutional need to change or otherwise modify this Court’s decision in Swain v. Alabama.” Id., at 5.

Amici supporting petitioner also emphasized the importance of the equal protection issue. See, e. g., Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, American Jewish Committee, and American Jewish Congress as Amici Curiae 24-36; Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae 11-17; Brief for Elizabeth Holtzman as Amicus Curiae 13.

See McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961 (1983) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); id., at 963 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

The eventual federal habeas corpus disposition of McCray , of course, proved to be one of the landmark eases that made the issues in this ease *111 ripe for review. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113 (CA2 1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1426. See also Pet. for Cert. 5-7 (relying heavily on McCray as a reason for review). In McCray, as in almost all opinions that have considered similar challenges, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explicitly addressed the equal protection issue and the viability of Swain. 750 F. 2d, at 1118-1124 . The pending petition for certiorari in McCray similarly raises the equal protection question that has long been central to this issue. Pet. for Cert, in No. 84-1426 (Question 2). Indeed, shortly after agreeing to hear Batson, the Court was presented with a motion to consolidate McCray and Batson, and consider the cases together. Presumably because the Court believed that Batson adequately presented the issues with which other courts had consistently grappled in considering this question, the Court denied the motion. See Abrams v. McCray, 471 U. S. 1097 (1985). Cf. ibid. (Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting from denial of motion to consolidate).

Although I disagree with his criticism of the Court in this case, I fully subscribe to The Chief Justice’s view, expressed today, that the Court should only address issues necessary to the disposition of the case or petition. For contrasting views, see, e. g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 551 (1986) (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (addressing merits even though majority of the Court found a lack of standing); Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U. S. 324 (1984) (concurring opinion, joined by Burger, C. J.) (expressing view on merits even though writ was dismissed as improvidently granted because state-court judgment rested on adequate and independent state grounds); Florida v. Casal, 462 U. S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C. J., concurring) (agreeing with Court that writ should be dismissed as improvidently granted because judgment rested on adequate and independent state grounds, but noting that “the citizens of the state must be aware that they have the power to amend state law to ensure rational law enforcement”). See also Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U. S. 1050 (1986) (ordering parties to address issue that neither party raised); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 468 U. S. 1214 (1984) (same).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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