holding that authority to make policy “may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority . . . . [M]unicipalities often spread policymaking authority among various officers and official bodies. As a result, particular officers may have authority to establish binding county policy respecting particular matters and to adjust that policy for the county in changing circumstances.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that authority to make policy “may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority . . . . [M]unicipalities often spread policymaking authority among various officers and official bodies. As a result, particular officers may have authority to establish binding county policy respecting particular matters and to adjust that policy for the county in changing circumstances.”
- holding that under Monell, if a “government’s authorized decisionmakers” make “the decision to adopt [a] particular course of action,” “it surely represents an act of official government ‘policy’” and “where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly”
- finding that court of appeals erred in dismissing petitioner's claim against a county when the prosecutor, the relevant final policymaker, “made a considered decision based on his understanding of the law and commanded the officers forcibly to enter petitioner's clinic,” and “[t]hat decision directly caused the violation of petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights.”
- holding that municipal liability under § 1983 attaches “where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing a final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Francis v. Carroll — not on the Supreme Court's list
475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986), superseded in part by statute as recognized in Francis v. Carroll, 659 F. Supp. 2d 619, 626
District Court, D. DelawareSep 22, 20092 citing opinionsby statutein partunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
For the reasons stated by Justice White, I agree that the municipal officers here were acting as policymakers within the meaning of Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). As the city of Cincinnati freely conceded, forcible entry of third-party property to effect an arrest was standard operating procedure in May 1977. Given that this procedure was consistent with federal, state, and local law at the time the case arose, it seems fair to infer that respondent county’s policy was no different. Moreover, under state law as definitively construed by the Court of Appeals, the county officials who opted for the forcible entry “had the authority to approve or disapprove such entries.” Ante, at 485 (White J., concurring). Given this combination of circumstances, I agree with Justice White that the decision to break down the door “sufficiently manifested county policy to warrant reversal of the judgment below.” Ibid. Because, however, I believe that the reasoning of the majority goes beyond that necessary to decide the case, and because I fear that the standard the majority articulates may be misread to expose municipalities to liability beyond that envisioned by the Court in Monell , I join only Parts I and II-A of the Court’s opinion and the judgment.