holding that authority to make policy “may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority . . . . [M]unicipalities often spread policymaking authority among various officers and official bodies. As a result, particular officers may have authority to establish binding county policy respecting particular matters and to adjust that policy for the county in changing circumstances.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that authority to make policy “may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority . . . . [M]unicipalities often spread policymaking authority among various officers and official bodies. As a result, particular officers may have authority to establish binding county policy respecting particular matters and to adjust that policy for the county in changing circumstances.”
- holding that under Monell, if a “government’s authorized decisionmakers” make “the decision to adopt [a] particular course of action,” “it surely represents an act of official government ‘policy’” and “where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly”
- finding that court of appeals erred in dismissing petitioner's claim against a county when the prosecutor, the relevant final policymaker, “made a considered decision based on his understanding of the law and commanded the officers forcibly to enter petitioner's clinic,” and “[t]hat decision directly caused the violation of petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights.”
- holding that municipal liability under § 1983 attaches “where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing a final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Francis v. Carroll — not on the Supreme Court's list
475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986), superseded in part by statute as recognized in Francis v. Carroll, 659 F. Supp. 2d 619, 626
District Court, D. DelawareSep 22, 20092 citing opinionsby statutein partunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Justice White,
concurring.
The forcible entry made in this case was not then illegal under federal, state, or local law. The city of Cincinnati frankly conceded that forcible entry of third-party property to effect otherwise valid arrests was standard operating procedure. There is no reason to believe that respondent county would abjure using lawful means to execute the capiases issued in this case or had limited the authority of its officers to use force in executing capiases. Further, the county officials who had the authority to approve or disapprove such entries opted for the forceful entry, a choice that was later held to be inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. Vesting discretion in its officers to use force and its use in this case sufficiently manifested county policy to warrant reversal of the judgment below.
*486 This does not mean that every act of municipal officers with final authority to effect or authorize arrests and searches represents the policy of the municipality. It would be different if Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 (1981), had been decided when the events at issue here occurred, if the State Constitution or statutes had forbidden forceful entries without a warrant, or if there had been a municipal ordinance to this effect. Local law enforcement officers are expected to obey the law and ordinarily swear to do so when they take office. Where the controlling law places limits on their authority, they cannot be said to have the authority to make contrary policy. Had the Sheriff or Prosecutor in this case failed to follow an existing warrant requirement, it would be absurd to say that he was nevertheless executing county policy in authorizing the forceful entry in this case and even stranger to say that the county would be liable if the Sheriff had secured a warrant and it turned out that he and the Magistrate had mistakenly thought there was probable cause for the warrant. If deliberate or mistaken acts like this, admittedly contrary to local law, expose the county to liability, it must be on the basis of respondeat superior and not because the officers’ acts represent local policy.
Such results would not conform to Monell and the cases following it. I do not understand the Court to hold otherwise in stating that municipal liability attaches where “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Ante, at 483-484. A sheriff, for example, is not the final policymaker with respect to the probable-cause requirement for a valid arrest. He has no alternative but to act in accordance with the established standard; and his deliberate or mistaken departure from the controlling law of arrest would not represent municipal policy.
In this case, however, the Sheriff and the Prosecutor chose a course that was not forbidden by any applicable law, a *487 choice that they then had the authority to make. This was county policy, and it was no less so at the time because a later decision of this Court declared unwarranted forceful entry into third-party premises to be violation of the Fourth Amendment. * Hence, I join the Court’s opinion and judgment.
The county has not challenged the retroactivity of Steagald v. United States, 461 U. S. 204 (1981), and I do not address that issue.