holding that some orders denying summary judgment constitute “ ‘final decisions’ ” under the collateral order doctrine
How later courts described this case
- holding that some orders denying summary judgment constitute “ ‘final decisions’ ” under the collateral order doctrine
- stating that, “[w]hen a district court has denied a defendant’s claim of right not to stand trial, on double jeopardy grounds, for example, we have consistently held the court’s decision appealable, for such a right cannot be effectively vindicated after the trial has occurred,” and holding that denial of a claim of qualified immunity, which confers immunity from suit, rather than mere defense to liability, is appealable collateral order
- holding that a claim of qualified immunity is separable from the merits of the underlying claim because “[a]n appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant’s claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question of law”
- holding that a state official may bring an interlocutory appeal when his or her qualified immunity defense is rejected at the summary judgment stage because “[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) — not on the Supreme Court's list
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223
Supreme Court of the United StatesJan 21, 20094 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Dederich, 825 F.2d 1317 (1987)
We reject appellants’ contention that the jurisdictional question here is governed by Mitchell and other governmental immunity cases.
Distinguished by Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126 (1986)
Accordingly, Mitchell is inapplicable and the district court’s decision on Scott’s motion is not one of that “small class” which is reviewable prior to the entry of a final judgment.4
Distinguished by a later decision, 803 F.2d 721 (1986)
Plaintiffs further argue that Mitchell v. Forsyth, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985), is inapplicable because: 1) the collateral order doctrine is subject to Fed. R. Civ.
Distinguished by Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Ulery, 787 F.2d 1239 (1986)
Because the rationale of Mitchell is inapplicable here, and because to extend it would erode the vitally important policies underlying the final-judgment rule, we decline to accept the position urged upon us.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
with whom The Chief Justice joins,
concurring in part.
I join Parts I, III, and IV of the majority opinion and the judgment of the Court. Our previous cases concerning the qualified immunity doctrine indicate that a defendant official whose conduct did not violate clearly established legal norms is entitled to avoid trial. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 815-819 (1982). This entitlement is analogous to the right to avoid trial protected by absolute immunity or by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Where the district court rejects claims that official immunity or double jeopardy preclude trial, the special nature of the asserted right justifies immediate review. The very purpose of such immunities is to protect the defendant from the burdens of trial, and the right will be irretrievably lost if its denial is not immediately appealable. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U. S. 500, 506-508 (1979); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 660-662 (1977). I agree that the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity comes within the small class of interlocutory orders appealable under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949).
Because I also agree that the District Court erred in holding that petitioner’s authorization of the wiretaps in 1970 violated legal rights that were clearly established at the time, I concur in the judgment of the Court. The conclusion that *538 petitioner is entitled to qualified immunity is sufficient to resolve this case, and therefore I would not reach the issue whether the Attorney General may claim absolute immunity when he acts to prevent a threat to national security. Accordingly, I decline to join Parts II and V of the Court’s opinion.