Opinion

Mitchell v. Forsyth

  • 472 U.S. 511
  • 53 U.S.L.W. 4798
  • 2 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 221
  • 105 S. Ct. 2806
  • 86 L. Ed. 2d 411
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 19, 1985
Status
Published
Author
Burger
On the bench
White, Blackmun, Burger, O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Powell, Rehnqutst, Rehnquist
Cited by
8,308 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.2%

Reported overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) — not on the Supreme Court's list

holding that some orders denying summary judgment constitute “ ‘final decisions’ ” under the collateral order doctrine

How later courts described this case

  • holding that some orders denying summary judgment constitute “ ‘final decisions’ ” under the collateral order doctrine
  • stating that, “[w]hen a district court has denied a defendant’s claim of right not to stand trial, on double jeopardy grounds, for example, we have consistently held the court’s decision appealable, for such a right cannot be effectively vindicated after the trial has occurred,” and holding that denial of a claim of qualified immunity, which confers immunity from suit, rather than mere defense to liability, is appealable collateral order
  • holding that a claim of qualified immunity is separable from the merits of the underlying claim because “[a]n appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant’s claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question of law”
  • holding that a state official may bring an interlocutory appeal when his or her qualified immunity defense is rejected at the summary judgment stage because “[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Reported overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) — not on the Supreme Court's list

    472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223
    Supreme Court of the United StatesJan 21, 20094 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by United States v. Dederich, 825 F.2d 1317 (1987)

    We reject appellants’ contention that the jurisdictional question here is governed by Mitchell and other governmental immunity cases.
    Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitAug 19, 1987Read it
  • Distinguished by Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126 (1986)

    Accordingly, Mitchell is inapplicable and the district court’s decision on Scott’s motion is not one of that “small class” which is reviewable prior to the entry of a final judgment.4
    Court of Appeals for the Third CircuitNov 14, 1986Read it
  • Distinguished by a later decision, 803 F.2d 721 (1986)

    Plaintiffs further argue that Mitchell v. Forsyth, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985), is inapplicable because: 1) the collateral order doctrine is subject to Fed. R. Civ.
    Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitSep 26, 1986Read it
  • Distinguished by Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Ulery, 787 F.2d 1239 (1986)

    Because the rationale of Mitchell is inapplicable here, and because to extend it would erode the vitally important policies underlying the final-judgment rule, we decline to accept the position urged upon us.
    Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitApr 2, 1986Read it

The opinion

Chief Justice Burger,

concurring in part.

With Justice O’Connor, I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court’s opinion and the judgment of the Court. I also agree that the Court’s discussion of the absolute immunity issue is unnecessary for the resolution of this case. I write separately to emphasize my agreement with Justice Stevens that the Court’s extended discussion of this issue reaches the wrong conclusion.

In Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972), we held that aides of Members of Congress who implement the legislative policies and decisions of the Member enjoy the same absolute immunity from suit under the Speech and Debate Clause that the Members themselves enjoy. As I noted in dissent in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 822 (1982), the logic underlying Gravel applies equally to top Executive aides. A Cabinet officer — and surely none more than the Attorney General — is an “aide” and arm of the President in *537 the execution of the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” It is an astonishing paradox that the aides of the 100 Senators and 435 Representatives share the absolute immunity of the Member, but the President’s chief aide in protecting internal national security does not. I agree that the petitioner was entitled to absolute immunity for actions undertaken in his exercise of the discretionary power of the President in the area of national security.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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