concluding that “[m]uch as a ‘bright line’ rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria,” and that “[a] court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second guessing”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “[m]uch as a ‘bright line’ rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria,” and that “[a] court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second guessing”
- holding that law enforcement officers' decision to pull over specific vehicles on suspicion of drug trafficking was clearly justified at its inception based on those vehicles' characteristics and driving patterns; analyzing whether investigative stop was "too long in duration" under the reasonably-related-in-scope prong
- holding that — where officer drew his gun, ordered driver out of truck, patted him down for weapons, and detained him for fifteen minutes until DEA agent arrived, and suspect’s vehicle was then searched by DEA agent — detention was an investigatory stop that required only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
- explaining that while an investigative Terry stop only requires reasonable suspicion, said stop could become a full-blown seizure requiring probable cause over time, but noting that there is "no rigid time limitation" that "distinguish[es] an investigative stop from a de facto arrest"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193 (1999)
But Sharpe, on further examination, is inapposite, for the court of appeals had assumed that the officers “had an articula-ble and reasonable suspicion that [the suspects] were engaged in marijuana trafficking when [the officers] stopped the Pontiac and the truck,” id. at 680, 105 S.Ct. 1568, and the Supreme Court accepted that assumption.
Distinguished by State v. Williams, 12 Fla. Supp. 2d 134 (1985)
Therefore Sharpe is readily distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
Both respondents are fugitives. 1 Their status raises a procedural question that is of more significance than the merits of the somewhat fact-bound questions that the Government’s petition for certiorari presented. 2 The procedural question is important because escapes by persons engaged in *722 the lucrative business of smuggling narcotics are apparently not uncommon, 3 and because the fugitive status of the litigants may have an impact on this Court’s disposition of the case.
If a defendant escapes, and remains at large while his appeal is pending, the appeal will normally be dismissed. 4 Over a century ago, in Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97 (1876), the Court explained the rationale for this type of disposition:
“It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render. In this case it is admitted that the plaintiff in error has escaped, and is not within the control of the court below, either actually, by being in custody, or constructively, by being out on bail. If we affirm the judgment, he is not likely to appear to submit to his sentence. If we reverse it and order a new trial, he will appear or not, as he may consider most for his interest. Under such circumstances, we are not inclined to hear and decide what may prove to be only a moot case.” 5
Almost a century later, in Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U. S. 534 (1975) (per curiam), we further noted that “[disposition by dismissal of pending appeals of escaped prisoners is a longstanding and established principle of American law,” and that “[t]his Court itself has long followed the practice of declining *723 to review the convictions of escaped criminal defendants.” 6 In the case now before the Court, the respondents did not become fugitives until after they had prevailed in the Court of Appeals and until after the Government had sought review in this Court. 7 The timing of the escape, however, plainly does not affect this Court’s power to base its disposition of the case on the fact that respondents have fled. Nor, in my opinion, at least in a case in which there is no dispute about the fugitives’ guilt, should there be any difference in the ultimate disposition of the appeal.
The record establishes that the respondents were apprehended while engaged in a serious and flagrant violation of law. Their appeal to the Court of Appeals was based on a claim that the evidence of their guilt was obtained in an unlawful search; such a claim, even if meritorious, establishes neither a lack of culpability nor any fundamental unfairness in the trial process. 8 It is therefore entirely appropriate to conclude that, as fugitives, these litigants should not be accorded standing to advance their claim on appeal. 9
As would have been true if they had escaped while their appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, neither of these litigants “is where he can be made to respond to any *724 judgment we .may render.” 10 In my judgment, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that respondents’ appeal to it was meritorious should make no difference in the ultimate outcome. Every application of the Smith rule necessarily assumes that an appeal may be meritorious. Moreover, the Court of Appeals’ ruling in respondents’ favor does not preclude the possibility that this Court will disagree. In short, for the purpose of deciding whether the Smith rule applies, I believe the merits of the appeal should be entirely disregarded. 11
The Court states, ante, at 681, n. 2, that because a “reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment may lead to the reinstatement of respondents’ convictions, respondents’ fugitive status does not render this case moot.” I agree that the case is not technically moot. 12 An escape, however, may compromise the adversary character of the litigation. The lawyer for the escapee presumably will have lost contact with his client; his desire to vindicate a faithless client may be less than zealous; and, as noted, the Court cannot have its normal control over one of the parties to the case before it. The risk that the adversary process will not function effectively counsels against deciding the merits of a case of this kind. 13
The correct disposition of this case, I believe, is to treat it as though the respondents’ escape had mooted the appeal. If we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and if we direct that the appeal from the judgment of the District *725 Court be dismissed, the consequences would be the same as if the escape had occurred in advance of the Court of Appeals’ decision. Moreover, by vacating that court’s judgment, the Government’s interest in eliminating the precedent that it has challenged in its certiorari petition would be vindicated. 14 Finally, such a disposition would make it unnecessary for this Court to decide the constitutional question that is presented. 15 That, for me, is a matter of paramount importance. 16
There is one adverse consequence of the disposition I propose. It would deprive the Court of the opportunity to write *726 an opinion in a Fourth Amendment case. The summary disposition of this case would not serve the interest of providing additional guidance to the law enforcement community. But regarding that interest as paramount would support the wholesale adoption of a practice of rendering advisory opinions at the request of the Executive — a practice the Court abjured at the beginning of our history. 17 We have, *727 instead, opted for a policy of judicial restraint — of studiously avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions. The correct implementation of that policy, I submit, *728 requires that we predicate the disposition of this case on the respondents’ fugitive status.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The Government’s petition for the grant of a writ of certiorari was filed on September 27,1983; it was granted on June 18,1984. On May 11,1984, respondent Sharpe’s counsel wrote a letter to the Court. It stated that, “as of this date, Mr. Sharpe is in fugitive status as to charges in the Northern District of Georgia and the State of North Carolina.” See Letter of Mark J. Kadish to Alexander Stevas, Clerk of the United States Supreme Court (May 11, 1984). Subsequently, on July 11, 1984, Judge Sol Blatt, Jr., of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina entered two orders forfeiting the bonds of both respondents. See Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis of William Harris Sharpe and Donald Davis Savage, Exhibit B. The Solicitor General states that the United States Attorney’s Office has advised the Department of Justice that, “to the best of its knowledge, respondents remain fugitives.” Reply Brief for United States 2.
The Government’s petition posed the following questions:
“1. Whether law enforcement officers may temporarily detain an individual reasonably suspected of criminal activity for the period — brief, but exceeding a few minutes — reasonably necessary to pursue a circumscribed investigation of the suspected criminal activity.
“2. Whether, assuming that the initial phase of either respondent’s detention was unduly extended, the illegality mandates suppression of a large shipment of marijuana which, because of its distinct odor, was discovered immediately thereafter in respondent Savage’s vehicle.” Pet. for Cert. I.
Cf. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U. S. 380, 385 (1984) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the Court “should focus [its] attention on methods of using [its] scarce resources wisely rather than laying another course of bricks in the building of a federal judicial bureaucracy”).
See, e. g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1, 2-3 (1984) (per curiam); United States v. Holmes, 680 F. 2d 1372, 1373 (CA11 1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1015 (1983); United States v. Wood, 550 F. 2d 435, 437-438 (CA9 1976); United States v. Sperling, 506 F. 2d 1323, 1345, n. 33 (CA2 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 962 (1975).
Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 365-366 (1970) (per curiam).
94 U. S., at 97 .
420 U. S., at 537 . That case also discussed an opinion issued over five years earlier, Molinaro v. New Jersey, supra. Regarding that opinion, we wrote:
“Thus, in Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365 (1970), we dismissed the appeal of an escaped criminal defendant, stating that no persuasive reason exists to adjudicate the merits of such a case and that an escape ‘disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.’ Id., at 366 .” 420 U. S., at 537 .
See also Eisler v. United States, 338 U. S. 189 (per curiam), and 338 U. S. 883 (1949); Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U. S. 692 (1887); Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97 (1876); cf. Allen v. Rose, 419 U. S. 1080 (1974).
See n. 1, supra.
Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976).
Cf. Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, 65 (1954).
Smith v. United States, 94 U. S., at 97 .
The Government disagrees. It proposes that the Court reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals if we disagree on the merits; however, if we agree with the Court of Appeals on the merits, the Government states that we “should vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court with directions to dismiss the appeals with prejudice.” Reply Brief for United States 6-7. The Court has not expressly endorsed the Government’s “heads I win, tails you lose” position.
See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S., at 366 .
See n. 11, supra.
Cf. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39-40 (1950).
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 549, 568-574 (1947); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought; not to pass on questions of constitutionality. . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable”); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of”); Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 295 (1905) (“It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case”).
Characteristically, it is a matter the Court simply ignores. See ante, at 681-682, n. 2. In Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1 (1984) (per curiam),, on which the Court relies, neither the Court nor the litigants based any argument on the respondent’s fugitive status. Moreover, it would have been inappropriate for this Court to vacate the judgment of the Florida court because we have no supervisory power over state courts. Once again, however, the Court has thus overlooked the “important differences between cases that come to us from state tribunals and those that arise in the federal system.” Id., at 7 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 972 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court’s reliance on United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U. S. 293, 294-295, n. 2 (1971), is also misplaced because the point Justice Stewart made for the Court was that the respondent in that case was not a fugitive. In making that point, Justice Stewart implicitly assumed that the doctrine of Smith v. United States, supra, would apply to a case in which the fugitive was the respondent as well as to one in which the fugitive was the petitioner.
See Haybum’s Case, 2 Dali. 409 (1792). Following that decision, this Court made clear, after a series of letters, its constitutional practice of not rendering advisory opinions. The correspondences began on July 18, 1793, when Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, wrote the following letter to Chief Justice John Jay and Associate Justices:
“Gentlemen:
“The war which has taken place among the powers of Europe produces frequent transactions within our ports and limits, on which questions arise of considerable difficulty, and of greater importance to the peace of the United States. Their questions depend for their solution on the construction of our treaties, on the laws of nature and nations, and on the laws of the land, and are often presented under circumstances which do not give a cognisance of them to the tribunals of the country. Yet their decision is so little analogous to the ordinary functions of the executive, as to occasion much embarrassment and difficulty to them. The President therefore would be much relieved if he found himself free to refer questions of this description to the opinions of the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, whose knowledge of the subject would secure us against errors dangerous to the peace of the United States, and their authority insure the respect of all parties. He has therefore asked the attendance of such of the judges as could be collected in time for the occasion, to know, in the first place, their opinion, whether the public may, with propriety, be availed of their advice on these questions? And if they may, to present, for their advice, the abstract questions which have already occurred, or may soon occur, from which they will themselves strike out such as any circumstances might, in their opinion, forbid them to pronounce on. I have the honour to be with sentiments of the most perfect respect, gentlemen,
“Your most obedient and humble servant,
“Thos. Jefferson”
3 Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 486-487 (H. Johnston ed. 1891) (emphasis in original).
Attached with the letter, on behalf of President Washington, were 29 questions. See 33 Writings of George Washington 15-19 (J. Fitzpatrick *727 ed. 1940). Two days later, Chief Justice Jay and the Associate Justices penned the following to President Washington:
“Sir:
“We have taken into consideration the letter written to us, by your direction, on the 18th inst., by the Secretary of State. The question, ‘whether the public may, with propriety, be availed of the advice of the judges on the questions alluded to,’ appears to us to be of much difficulty as well as importance. As it affects the judicial department, we feel a reluctance to decide it without the advice and participation of our absent brethen.
“The occasion which induced our being convened is doubtless urgent; of the degree of that urgency we cannot judge, and consequently cannot propose that the answer to this question be postponed until the sitting of the Supreme Court. We are not only disposed, but desirous, to promote the welfare of our country in every way that may consist with our official duties. We are pleased, sir, with every opportunity of manifesting our respect for you, and are solicitous to do whatever may be in our power to render your administration as easy and agreeable to yourself as it is to our country. If circumstances should forbid further delay, we will immediately resume the consideration of the question, and decide it.
“We have the honour to be, with perfect respect, your most obedient and most humble servants.” 3 Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 487-488 (Johnston ed. 1891).
President Washington promptly returned a reply:
“Gentlemen: The circumstances, which had induced me to ask your counsel on certain legal questions interesting to the public, exist now as they did then; but I by no means press a decision, whereon you wish the advice and participation of your absent brethen. Whenever, therefore, their presence shall enable you to give it with more satisfaction to yourselves, I shall accept it with pleasure. With sentiments of high respect, I am, &c.” 33 Writings of George Washington 28 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940).
Finally, Chief Justice Jay and the Associate Justices returned their response:
“Sir:
‘We have considered the previous question stated in a letter written by your direction to us by the Secretary of State on the 18th of last month, [regarding] the lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of the government. These being in certain respects *728 checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court of the last resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to, especially as the power given by the Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of departments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as expressly united to the executive departments.
“We exceedingly regret every event that may cause embarrassment to your administration, but we derive consolation from the reflection that your judgment will discern what is right, and that your usual prudence, decision, and firmness will surmount every obstacle to the preservation of the rights, peace, and dignity of the United States.
“We have the honour to be, with perfect respect, sir, your most obedient and most humble servants.” 3 Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 488-489 (Johnston ed. 1891) (emphasis in original).