concluding that “[m]uch as a ‘bright line’ rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria,” and that “[a] court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second guessing”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “[m]uch as a ‘bright line’ rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria,” and that “[a] court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second guessing”
- holding that law enforcement officers' decision to pull over specific vehicles on suspicion of drug trafficking was clearly justified at its inception based on those vehicles' characteristics and driving patterns; analyzing whether investigative stop was "too long in duration" under the reasonably-related-in-scope prong
- holding that — where officer drew his gun, ordered driver out of truck, patted him down for weapons, and detained him for fifteen minutes until DEA agent arrived, and suspect’s vehicle was then searched by DEA agent — detention was an investigatory stop that required only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
- explaining that while an investigative Terry stop only requires reasonable suspicion, said stop could become a full-blown seizure requiring probable cause over time, but noting that there is "no rigid time limitation" that "distinguish[es] an investigative stop from a de facto arrest"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193 (1999)
But Sharpe, on further examination, is inapposite, for the court of appeals had assumed that the officers “had an articula-ble and reasonable suspicion that [the suspects] were engaged in marijuana trafficking when [the officers] stopped the Pontiac and the truck,” id. at 680, 105 S.Ct. 1568, and the Supreme Court accepted that assumption.
Distinguished by State v. Williams, 12 Fla. Supp. 2d 134 (1985)
Therefore Sharpe is readily distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
In view of respondents’ fugitive status, see ante, at 681-682, n. 2, I would have vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court with directions to dismiss the respondents’ appeal from the District Court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals. See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365 (1970).
This Court, however, does not follow that path, and chooses to decide the case on the merits. I therefore also reach the merits and join the Court’s opinion.