explaining that factual findings may not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous, and that “when a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that factual findings may not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous, and that “when a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error”
- stating that when factual findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court’s findings because the trial court had the opportunity to note variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the court’s understanding of and belief in what is said
- finding that the reviewing court "may not reverse [the district court's account of the evidence] even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently ... [such that] a district court's choice between two permissible views of the evidence cannot, therefore, be clearly erroneous"
- explaining that where two differing in- terpretations are neither illogical or implausible and each interpre- tation “has support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record; and if either interpretation has been drawn by a [trial] court[,]” a court of review cannot find the trial court’s finding to be clearly erroneous
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Criticized by Philbrook v. Ansonia Board Of Education, 925 F.2d 47 (1991)
Verbatim adoption of findings prepared by prevailing parties has been criticized by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Anderson, 470 U.S. at 571-72, 105 S.Ct. at 1510; United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 615 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 2856, 2866 n. 13, 41 L.Ed.2d 978 (1974); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 & n. 4, 84 S.Ct. 1044, 1047 & n. 4, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964), and by circuit courts.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Robert H. Herscher, 9 F.3d 113 (1993)
" Id. This case is distinguishable from Maciaga, 965 F.2d 404, where the court reversed the trial court's finding of "more than typical planning" in part because of the simplicity of the crime.
Distinguished by Morrison v. Char, 797 F.2d 752 (1986)
As such, City of Bessemer City is inapposite.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment.
I would like to join the Court’s opinion, for I think its judgment is correct, and I agree with most of what the Court *582 says. I, however, do not join the broad dictum, ante, at 573-574, to the effect that the same result is to be reached when the district court’s findings are based wholly on documentary evidence and do not rest at all on credibility determinations. In the past, I have joined at least one opinion that, generally, is to the opposite effect. See United States v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 285 F. 2d 381, 388 (CA8 1960). See also Ralston Purina Co. v. General Foods Corp., 442 F. 2d 389, 391 (CA8 1971); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip Co., 540 F. 2d 927, 930 (CA8 1976); Swanson v. Baker Industries, Inc., 615 F. 2d 479, 483 (CA8 1980).
While the Court may be correct in its dictum today, certainly this case does not require us to decide the question. The record contains far more than documentary evidence, as the Court’s opinion so adequately discloses. In a case that requires resolution of the question, I might eventually be persuaded that the Court’s approach is wise. I.prefer, however, to wait for a case where the issue must be resolved and where it has been briefed and argued by the parties, rather than to address the issue by edict without these customary safeguards.
I therefore join the Court only in its judgment and not in its opinion.