explaining that factual findings may not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous, and that “when a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that factual findings may not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous, and that “when a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error”
- stating that when factual findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court’s findings because the trial court had the opportunity to note variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the court’s understanding of and belief in what is said
- finding that the reviewing court "may not reverse [the district court's account of the evidence] even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently ... [such that] a district court's choice between two permissible views of the evidence cannot, therefore, be clearly erroneous"
- explaining that where two differing in- terpretations are neither illogical or implausible and each interpre- tation “has support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record; and if either interpretation has been drawn by a [trial] court[,]” a court of review cannot find the trial court’s finding to be clearly erroneous
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Criticized by Philbrook v. Ansonia Board Of Education, 925 F.2d 47 (1991)
Verbatim adoption of findings prepared by prevailing parties has been criticized by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Anderson, 470 U.S. at 571-72, 105 S.Ct. at 1510; United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 615 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 2856, 2866 n. 13, 41 L.Ed.2d 978 (1974); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 & n. 4, 84 S.Ct. 1044, 1047 & n. 4, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964), and by circuit courts.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Robert H. Herscher, 9 F.3d 113 (1993)
" Id. This case is distinguishable from Maciaga, 965 F.2d 404, where the court reversed the trial court's finding of "more than typical planning" in part because of the simplicity of the crime.
Distinguished by Morrison v. Char, 797 F.2d 752 (1986)
As such, City of Bessemer City is inapposite.
The opinion
Justice Powell,
concurring.
I do not dissent from the judgment that the Court of Appeals misapplied Rule 52(a) in this case. I write separately, however, because I am concerned that one may read the Court’s opinion as implying criticism of the Court of Appeals for the very fact that it engaged in a comprehensive review of the entire record of this case. Such a reading may encourage overburdened Courts of Appeals simply to apply Rule 52(a) in a conclusory fashion, rather than to undertake the type of burdensome review that may be appropriate in some cases.
In this case, the Court of Appeals made no arbitrary judgment that the action of the District Court was clearly erroneous. On the contrary, the court meticulously reviewed the entire record and reached the conclusion that the District Court was in error. One easily could agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court committed a mistake in its finding of sex discrimination, based, as it was, on fragmentary statements made years before * in informal exchanges between members of the selection committee and the applicants for the position to be filled. On the record before us, however, the factual issue fairly could be decided for either party. Therefore, as the Court holds, the District Court’s decision was not clearly erroneous within the meaning of Rule 52(a).
The Charlotte branch of the EEOC, with whom petitioner filed a complaint, took no action for five years. The testimony at trial, therefore, was based on stale recollections.