explaining that, in connection with sentencing, a trial court “must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant,” since “highly relevant — if not essential — to [the court’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, in connection with sentencing, a trial court “must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant,” since “highly relevant — if not essential — to [the court’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics”
- explaining that, “after retrial and conviction follow‐ ing a defendant’s successful appeal, a sentencing authority may justify an increased sentence by affirmatively identify‐ ing relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to 30 the original sentencing proceedings”
- holding a district court “may justify an increased sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing proceedings” (emphasis added)
- noting that “the judge informed the parties that, although he did not consider pending charges when sentencing a defendant, he always took into account prior criminal convictions. This, of course, was proper; indeed, failure to do so would have been inappropriate” (emphases in original)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring in the judgment.
The reason I am unable to join the opinion that The Chief Justice has authored is that it interprets North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969), as resting entirely on a concern with the actual vindictiveness of the sentencing judge and does not identify the interest in protecting the defendant against the reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness that might deter him from prosecuting a meritorious appeal. See id., at 724-725 . “The rationale of our judgment in the Pearce case, however, was not grounded upon the proposition that actual retaliatory motivation must inevitably exist. Rather, we emphasized that ‘since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.’” Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21, 28 (1974) (quoting Pearce, 395 U. S., at 725 ). What I believe to be the correct reading of Pearce is set forth in Judge *575 Markey’s able opinion for the Court of Appeals. See 700 F. 2d 663 (CA11 1983).
Because the flaw in The Chief Justice’s opinion infects its Parts II-A and III-C as well as Parts II-B and III-B, I cannot join Justice Powell’s opinion, though I, like Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, Justice Black-mun, and Justice Powell, would decide this case on the ground that affirmance of a prior conviction after the initial sentencing constitutes the type of intervening event that may be considered by a trial judge as a ground for enhancing a sentence after a successful appeal.