explaining that, in connection with sentencing, a trial court “must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant,” since “highly relevant — if not essential — to [the court’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, in connection with sentencing, a trial court “must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant,” since “highly relevant — if not essential — to [the court’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics”
- explaining that, “after retrial and conviction follow‐ ing a defendant’s successful appeal, a sentencing authority may justify an increased sentence by affirmatively identify‐ ing relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to 30 the original sentencing proceedings”
- holding a district court “may justify an increased sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing proceedings” (emphasis added)
- noting that “the judge informed the parties that, although he did not consider pending charges when sentencing a defendant, he always took into account prior criminal convictions. This, of course, was proper; indeed, failure to do so would have been inappropriate” (emphases in original)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*573 Justice Powell,
with whom Justice Blackmun joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join all but Parts II-B and III-B of the Court’s opinion. I write to emphasize my view that this case involves a straightforward application of the Court’s holding in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969). The trial judge applied Pearce with commendable care, drawing a distinction at the sentencing stage of the first trial between undecided pending charges and prior convictions. At the sentencing stage following the second trial, the judge stated on the record that “[a]t this time, [petitioner] comes before me with two convictions. Last time, he came before me with one conviction.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-42.
Petitioner insists that this explanation of the increased sentence is insufficient because it does not, in the words of Pearce , “concer[n] identifiable conduct on the part of the [petitioner] occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.” 395 U. S., at 726 (emphasis added). He argues that the “conduct” was his prior crime; not the conviction.
At a different point in Pearce , however, the Court stated that “a new sentence, whether greater or less than the original sentence, [may be imposed] in the light of events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the defendant’s ‘life, health, habits, conduct, mental and moral propensities.’” Id., at 723 (emphasis added). The difference in language relied upon by petitioner is a matter of semantics — not substance. As the Court of Appeals stated, petitioner’s argument would “exal[t] words above substance,” 700 F. 2d 663, 667 (1983). When read properly, there simply is no conflict in the Pearce language. *
*574 The Pearce presumption is not simply concerned with actual vindictiveness, but also was intended to protect against reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness that could deter a defendant from appealing a first conviction. 395 U. S., at 725 . Both of these concerns are fully met in this case. It would be difficult to think of an event or occurrence more relevant to the determination of a proper sentence than a criminal conviction obtained in the interim between an original sentencing and a sentencing following retrial.
I view the portions of the Court opinion that I have joined as being fully consistent with the foregoing views.
Indeed in most situations — such as here — relevant conduct of the defendant is subsumed in the term “events.” Of course, there may be subsequent events — as well as subsequent conduct — that are irrelevant to any question of a sentence enhancement. Clearly this is not such a case.